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Abstract 
 
The characteristics that distinguish most developing countries, compared to large 
industrialized countries, include: greater exposure to supply shocks in general and trade 
volatility in particular, procyclicality of both domestic fiscal policy and international 
finance, lower credibility with respect to both price stability and default risk, and other 
imperfect institutions.   These characteristics warrant appropriate models. 
Models of dynamic inconsistency in monetary policy and the need for central 
bank independence and commitment to nominal targets apply even more strongly to 
developing countries.  But because most developing countries are price-takers on world 
markets, the small open economy model, with nontraded goods, is often more useful than 
the two-country two-good model.    Contractionary effects of devaluation are also far 
more important for developing countries, particularly the balance sheet effects that arise 
from currency mismatch.  The exchange rate was the favored nominal anchor for 
monetary policy in inflation stabilizations of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  After the 
currency crises of 1994-2001, the conventional wisdom anointed Inflation Targeting as 
the preferred monetary regime in place of exchange rate targets.  But events associated 
with the global crisis of 2007-09 have revealed limitations to the choice of CPI for the 
role of price index.    
  The participation of emerging markets in global finance is a major reason why 
they have by now earned their own large body of research, but it also means that they 
remain highly prone to problems of asymmetric information, illiquidity, default risk, 
moral hazard and imperfect institutions.  Many of the models designed to fit emerging 
market countries were built around such financial market imperfections;  few economists 
thought this inappropriate.    With the global crisis of 2007-09, the tables have turned:  
economists should now consider drawing on the models of emerging market crises to try 
to understand the unexpected imperfections and failures of advanced-country financial 
markets. 
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Monetary Policy in Emerging Market Countries: A Survey 
 
Thirty years ago, the topic of Macroeconomics or Monetary Economics for 
Developing Countries hardly existed
1, beyond a few papers regarding devaluation.
2    Nor 
did the term “emerging markets” exist.   Certainly it was not appropriate at that time to 
apply to such countries the models that had been designed for industrialized countries, 
with their assumption of financial sectors that were highly market-oriented and open to 
international flows.   To the contrary, developing countries typically suffered from 
“financial repression” under which the only financial intermediaries were uncompetitive 
banks and the government itself, which kept nominal interest rates artificially low (often 
well below the inflation rate) and allocated capital administratively rather than by market 
forces.
3    Capital inflows and outflows were heavily discouraged, particularly by capital 
controls, and were thus largely limited to foreign direct investment and loans from the 
World Bank and other international financial institutions. 
 
Over time, the financial sectors of most developing countries – at least those 
known as emerging markets – have gradually become more liberalized and open.   The 
globalization of their finances began in the late 1970s with the syndicated bank loans that 
recycled petrodollars to oil-importers.  Successive waves of capital inflow followed after 
1990 and again after 2003.   The largest outpouring of economic research was provoked 
not so much by the capital booms themselves as by the subsequent capital busts:  the 
international debt crisis of 1982-89, the emerging market crises of 1995-2001, and 
perhaps the global financial crisis of 2008-09. 
 
  In any case, the literature on emerging markets now occupies a very large share of 
the field of international finance and macroeconomics.    International capital flows are 
central to much of the research on macroeconomics in developing countries.  This 
includes both efficient-market models that were originally designed to describe advanced 
economies and market-imperfection models that have been designed to allow for the 
realities of default risk, procyclicality, asymmetric information, imperfect property rights 
and other flawed institutions.    
 
  In the latter part of the 19
th century most of the vineyards of Europe were 
destroyed by the microscopic aphid Phylloxera vastatrix.  Eventually a desperate last 
resort was tried: grafting susceptible European vines onto resistant American root 
stock.  Purist French vintners initially disdained what they considered 
compromising the refined tastes of their grape varieties.   But it saved the European 
                                                 
1 The field apparently did not get a comprehensive textbook of its own until Agenor and Montiel (1
st edition 
1996, 2
nd edition 1999). 
2 Two seminal papers on devaluation in developing countries were Diaz-Alejandro (1963) and Cooper 
(1971).     
3 McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973).   King and Levine (1993) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), 
using data for 80 and 74 countries, respectively, conclude that domestic financial development is conducive 
to growth.   Rajan and Zingales (1998a) support the causal interpretation by means of data on disaggregated 
industrial sectors and their dependence on external finance.   4
vineyards, and did not impair the quality of the wine.   The New World had come to 
the rescue of the Old. 
 
  In 2007-08, the global financial system was grievously infected by so-called 
toxic assets originating in the United States.   Many ask what fundamental 
rethinking will be necessary to save macroeconomic theory.  Some answers may lie 
with models that have been applied to fit the realities of emerging markets, models 
that are at home with the financial market imperfections that have now unexpectedly 
turned up in industrialized countries as well.   Purists will be reluctant to seek 
salvation from this direction.  But they should not fear.  The hardy root stock of 
emerging market models is incompatible with fine taste.   
 
 
1. Why do we need different models for emerging markets? 
 
At a high enough level of abstraction, it could be argued, one theory should apply 
for all.  Why do we need separate models for developing countries?  What makes them 
different?     We begin the chapter by considering the general structural characteristics 
that tend to differentiate these countries as a group, though it is important also to 
acknowledge the heterogeneity among them. 
  Developing countries tend to have less developed institutions (almost by 
definition), and specifically to have lower central bank credibility, than industrialized 
countries.
 4    Lower central bank credibility usually stems from a history of price 
instability, including hyperinflation in some cases, which in turn is sometimes 
attributable to past reliance on seignorage as a means of government finance in the 
absence of a well-developed fiscal system.   Another common feature is an uncompetitive 
banking system, which is again in part attributable to a public finance problem: a 
traditional reliance on the banks as a source of finance, through a combination of 
financial repression and controls on capital outflows.       
 
Another structural difference is that the goods markets of small developing 
countries are often more exposed to international influences than those of, say, Europe or 
Japan.    Although their trade barriers and transport costs have historically tended to 
exceed those of rich countries, these obstacles to trade have come down over time.  
Furthermore developing countries tend to be smaller in size and more dependent on 
exports of agricultural and mineral commodities than are industrialized countries.    Even 
such standard labor-intensive manufactured exports as clothing, textiles, shoes, and basic 
consumer electronics are often treated on world markets as close substitutes across  
suppliers.    Therefore these countries are typically small enough that they can be 
regarded as price-takers for tradable goods on world markets.   Hence the “small open 
economy” model.    
                                                 
4 E.g., Fraga, Goldafjn and Minella (2003).   5
Developing countries tend to be subject to more volatility than rich countries.
5   
Volatility comes from both supply shocks and demand shocks.   One reason for the 
greater magnitude of supply shocks is that primary products (agriculture, mining, forestry 
and fishing) make up a larger share of their economies.  These activities are vulnerable 
both to extreme weather events domestically and to volatile prices on world markets.  
Droughts, floods, hurricanes, and other weather events tend to have a much larger effect 
on GDP in developing countries than industrialized ones.     When a hurricane hits a 
Caribbean island, it can virtually wipe out the year’s banana crop and tourist season – 
thus eliminating the two biggest sectors in some of those tropical economies.    Moreover, 
the terms of trade are notoriously volatile for small developing countries, especially those 
dependent on agricultural and mineral exports.    In large rich countries, the fluctuations 
in the terms of trade are both smaller and less likely to be exogenous.   
Volatility also arises from domestic macroeconomic and political instability. 
Although most developing countries in the 1990s brought under control the chronic 
pattern of runaway budget deficits, money creation, and inflation, that they had 
experienced in the preceding two decades, most have still been subject to monetary and 
fiscal policy that is procyclical rather than countercyclical.    Often income inequality and 
populist political economy are deep fundamental forces. 
Another structural difference is the greater incidence of default risk.
6  Even for 
government officials who sincerely pursue macroeconomic discipline, they may face 
debt-intolerance: global investors will demand higher interest rates in response to 
increases in debt that would not worry them coming from a rich country.  The 
explanation may be the reputational effects of a long history of defaulting or inflating 
away debt.
7   The reputation is captured, in part, by agency ratings.
8 
Additional imperfections in financial markets can sometimes be traced to 
underdeveloped institutions, such as poor protection of property rights, bank loans made 
under administrative guidance or connected lending, and even government corruption.
9      
With each round of financial turbulence, however, it has become harder and harder to 
attribute crises in emerging markets solely to failings in the macroeconomic policies or 
financial structures of the countries in question.   Theories of multiple equilibrium and 
contagion reflect that not all the volatility experienced by developing countries arises 
domestically.  Much comes from outside, from global financial markets. 
                                                 
5 Hausmann, Panizza, and Rigobon (2006) find that real exchange rate volatility is three times higher in 
developing countries than in industrialized countries (but that the difference is not attributable to larger 
shocks).   As De Santis and Imrohoroğlu (1997) report, stock market volatility is higher too. 
6  Blanchard (2005) explores implications of default risk for monetary policy.   
7  The term “debt intolerance” comes from Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano  (2003).    They argue that 
countries with a poor history of default and inflation may have to keep their ratios of external debt to GDP 
as low as 15 percent to be safe from the extreme duress of debt crises, levels that would be easily managed 
by the standards of advanced countries.    The tendency for budget deficits to push interest rates up more 
quickly in debt-intolerant countries than in advanced countries helps explain why fiscal multipliers appear 
to be substantially lower in developing countries  --  Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2009).  (Trade openness 
is another reason.) 
8 Rigobon (2002) finds that Mexico’s susceptibility to international contagion diminished sharply, after it 
was upgraded by Moody’s in 2000.   Eichengreen and Mody (2000, 2004) confirm that ratings and default 
history are reflected in the interest rates that borrowers must pay. 
9 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and  
Shleifer (2000) and Wei (2000), among many others.   6
 
The next section of this chapter considers goods markets and concludes that the 
small open economy model is probably most appropriate for lower-income and middle-
income countries:    prices of traded goods are taken as given on world markets.  Two key 
variants feature roles for nontraded goods and contractionary effects of devaluation.  The 
subsequent three sections focus on monetary policy per se.  They explore, respectively, 
the topics of inflation (including high-inflation episodes, stabilization, and central bank 
independence), nominal anchors, and exchange rate regimes.   The last three sections of 
the chapter focus on the boom-bust cycle experienced by so many emerging markets.  
They cover, respectively, procyclicality (especially in the case of commodity exporters), 
capital flows, and crises. 
 
 
2. Goods markets, pricing, and devaluation 
 
As already noted, because developing countries tend to be smaller economically 
than major industrialized countries, they are more likely to fit the small open economy 
model:  they can be regarded as price-takers, not just for their import goods, but for their 
export goods as well.   That is, the prices of their tradable goods are generally taken as 
given on world markets.
10   It follows that a devaluation should push up the prices of 
tradable goods quickly and in proportion.      
 
2.1  Traded goods, pass-through and the Law of One Price 
 
    The traditional view has long been that developing countries, especially small 
ones, experience rapid pass-through of exchange rate changes into import prices, and then 
to the general price level.   There is evidence in the pass-through literature that exchange 
rate changes are indeed reflected in imports more rapidly when the market is a 
developing country than when it is the United States or another industrialized country.
11    
The pass-through coefficient tells to what extent a devaluation has been passed through 
into higher prices of goods sold domestically, say, within the first year.  Pass-through has 
historically been higher and faster for developing countries than for industrialized 
countries.   For simplicity, it is common to assume that pass-through to import prices is 
complete and instantaneous. 
   This assumption appears to have become somewhat less valid, especially in the 
big emerging market devaluations of the 1990s.  Pass-through coefficients appear to 
have declined in developing countries, though they remain well above those of 
industrialized economies.
12         
                                                 
10  The price-taking assumption requires three conditions: intrinsic perfect substitutability in the product as 
between domestic and foreign, low trade barriers, and low monopoly power.   Saudi Arabia, for example, 
does not satisfy the third condition, due to its large size in world oil markets.  
11 High pass-through especially characterizes developing countries that are (unofficially) dollarized in the 
sense that a high percentage of assets and liabilities are denominated in dollars.  Reinhart, Rogoff, and 
Savastano (2003b). 
12   Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2003, 2005) find that the price indexes are kept down by 
substitution away from imports toward cheaper local substitutes.   Frankel, Parsley and Wei (2005) are   7
  On the export side, agricultural and mineral products, which remain important 
exports in many developing countries, tend to face prices that are determined on world 
markets.   Because they are homogeneous products, arbitrage is able to keep the price of 
oil or copper or coffee in line across countries, and few producers have much monopoly 
power.   The situation is less clear, however, regarding the pricing of manufactures and 
services.   Clothing products or call centers in one country may or may not be treated by 
customers as perfect substitutes for clothing or call centers in another country. 
 
2.2  When export prices are sticky  
  
  There is good empirical evidence that an increase in the nominal exchange rate 
defined as the price of foreign currency (that is, a devaluation or depreciation of the 
domestic currency) causes an increase in the real exchange rate.
13    There are two 
possible approaches to such variation in the real exchange rate.  First, it can be 
interpreted as evidence of stickiness in the nominal prices of traded goods, especially  
non-commodity export goods, which in turn requires some sort of barriers to international 
arbitrage, such as tariffs or transportation costs.   Second, it could be interpreted as a 
manifestation that nontraded goods and services, which by definition are not exposed to 
international competition, play an important role in the price index.   Both approaches are 
fruitful, because both elements are typically at work.
14
 
  If prices of exports are treated as sticky in domestic currency, then traditional 
textbook models of the trade balance are more relevant.   Developing countries tend to 
face higher price-elasticities of demand for their exports than do industrialized countries.  
Thus it may be easier for an econometrician to find the Marshall-Lerner condition 
satisfied, though one must allow for the usual lags in quantity response to a devaluation, 
producing a J-curve pattern in the response of the trade balance.
15 
   
2.3  NonTraded Goods   
 
  The alternative approach is to stick rigorously to the small open economy 
assumption, that prices of all traded goods are determined on world markets, but to 
                                                                                                                                                 
among those finding that passthrough to prices of narrowly defined import products is indeed higher for 
developing countries, but that it has declined since 1990, and investigating the reasons.   Loayaza and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) find a decline in passthrough for Latin America.  One explanation for the decline 
since the 1980s is an environment of greater price stability – Choudhri and Hakura (2006). 
13 E.g., Edwards (1989),  Taylor (2002), and Bahmani-Oskooee,  Hegerty and  Kutan  (2008).  In other 
words, though some real exchange rate fluctuations are exogenous – and would show up in prices if the 
exchange rate were fixed -- some are not. 
14  Indeed, the boundary between the two approaches is not as firm as it used to seem.   On the one hand, 
even highly tradable goods have a non-traded component at the retail level (the labor and real estate that go 
into distribution costs and retail sales) --  Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005) and Burstein, Neves, 
and Rebelo (2003).  On the other hand, even goods that have in the past been considered nontradable can 
become tradable if, for example, productivity reduces their costs below the level of transport costs and thus 
makes it profitable to export them --  Bergin, Glick, and Taylor (2006) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005).  
This is a promising area of research. 
15 Two empirical studies of trade elasticities for developing countries are Marquez (2002) and Bahmani-
Oskooee and Kara (2005).    8
introduce a second category: nontraded goods and services.    Define Q to be the real 
exchange rate:          
) (
*) (
CPI
CPI E
Q ≡       (1) 
Where 
E    ≡  the nominal exchange rate, in units of domestic currency per foreign. 
CPI  ≡ the domestic Consumer Price Index, and  
CPI* ≡ the world Consumer Price Index. 
Assume that the price indices, both at home and abroad, are Cobb-Douglas functions of 
two sectors, tradable goods (TG) and nontradable goods (NTG), and that for simplicity 
the weight on the nontradable sector,  α , is the same at home and abroad: 
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We observe the real exchange vary, including sometimes in apparent response to 
variation in the nominal exchange rate.  The two possible interpretations, again, are: (1) 
variation in the relative price of traded goods (EPTG *)/PTG, which is the case considered 
in the preceding section, or (2) variation in the within-country relative price of nontraded 
goods (i.e., the price of nontraded goods relative to traded goods).  In this section, to 
focus on the latter, assume that international arbitrage keeps traded goods prices in line:  
PTG = EPTG*.      Then the real exchange depends only on the relative price of nontraded 
goods.        
α
α
) / (
*) / * (
TG NTG
TG NTG
P P
P P
Q ≡                       (2) 
If the relative price of nontraded goods goes up in one country, that country’s currency 
will exhibit a real appreciation. 
16   
  Two sources of variation in the relative price of nontraded goods make this simple 
equation useful and interesting, particularly for developing countries.    They are very 
different in character:  one is best thought of as monetary in origin and short-term in 
duration, the other as real and long-term.    
  Begin with the latter: the famous Balassa (1964)-Samuelson (1964) effect.     An 
empirical regularity that shows up robustly in long-term data samples, whether cross-
section or time series, is that when a country’s per capita income is higher, its currency is 
stronger in real terms.  This real appreciation can in turn usually be associated with an 
increase in the relative price of nontraded goods, as per the above equation.    The 
elasticity coefficient is estimated at around .4.
17   Balassa and Samuelson identified the 
causal mechanism as productivity growth that happens to be concentrated in the tradable 
                                                 
16  There was a time when some economists working in developing countries insisted that the proper 
definition of the term “real exchange rate” was the price of traded goods relative to non-traded goods..  
Harberger (1986). 
17 E.g., Rogoff (1996).   9
good sector.    (Bergin, et al, 2006, and Ghironi and Melitz, 2005, have shown 
theoretically why this may be no coincidence.)   Regardless of the mechanism, the 
empirical regularity is well-established.
18 
  Having said that, individual countries can deviate very far from the Balassa-
Samuelson line, especially in the short run.   There has been an unfortunate tendency, 
among those papers that invoke the Balassa-Samuelson relationship, to try to assign it 
responsibility for explaining all variation in the relative price of nontraded goods and 
therefore in the real exchange rate, even in the short run.   A more sensible approach 
would be to recognize the large temporary departures of the real exchange rate from the 
Balassa-Samuelson line, and to think about what causes them first to appear and then 
disappear gradually over time. 
  Fortunately, we have long had some simple models of how monetary factors can 
explain large temporary swings in the real exchange rate.  A monetary expansion in a 
country with a currency peg will show up as inflation in nontraded goods prices, and 
therefore as real appreciation, in the short run.    A devaluation will rapidly raise the 
domestic price of traded goods, thereby reducing the relative price of nontraded goods 
and showing up as a real depreciation.   The Salter-Swan model originally showed these 
effects, and their implications for internal balance (attaining the desired trade balance) 
and external balance (attaining the desired point on a tradeoff between output and price 
level acceleration).
19    
Dornbusch (1973, 1980) extended the nontraded goods model, in research on the 
case of pegged countries that was once as well-known as his famous overshooting model 
for the case of floating countries.   The extension was to marry Salter-Swan with the 
Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments.   No flexible-price assumptions were 
harmed in the making of this model:  The nominal price of nontraded goods was free to 
adjust.   But, in the aftermath of a devaluation or in the aftermath of a domestic credit 
contraction, the levels of reserves and money supply would lie below their long-run 
equilibria.    Only via a balance of payments surplus could reserves flow in over time, 
thereby gradually raising the overall money supply and nontraded goods prices in 
tandem.  In the long run all prices and quantities, including the real exchange rate, would 
be back to their equilibrium values -- but only in the long run.   Movements in the relative 
price of nontraded goods that arise from money factors in the short run and from Balassa-
Samuelson in the long run remain a good way to think about real exchange rates in 
developing countries. 
 
2.4     Contractionary effects of devaluation 
 
Devaluation is supposed to be expansionary for the economy, in a “Keynesian 
approach to the trade balance,” that is, in a model where higher demand for domestic 
goods, whether coming from domestic residents or foreign, leads to higher output rather 
than higher prices.    Yet, in currency crises that afflict developing countries, devaluation 
often seems to be associated with recession rather than expansion. 
 
Political costs of devaluation 
                                                 
18 Kravis and Lipsey (1988), De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994), and Choudhri and Khan (2005). 
19 Salter (1959) and Swan (1963) and Corden (1994).   10
In a widely quoted statistic, Cooper (1971) found that political leaders often lose 
office in the year following devaluation.  Frankel (2005) updated the estimate and 
verified statistical significance: A political leader in a developing country is almost twice 
as likely to lose office in the six months following a currency crash as otherwise.   
Finance ministers and central bank governors are even more vulnerable.   The political 
unpopularity of devaluations in developing countries helps explain why policy makers 
often postpone devaluations until after elections.
20   
Why are devaluations so unpopular?  It is often thought that they have adverse 
distributional effects.  But the urban elites that are most important to the political process 
in most developing countries are more likely to benefit from the relative price effects of 
devaluation (an increase in the price of agricultural products relative to services) than is 
the rural population.    One possibility is that devaluations act as a proxy for unpopular 
IMF austerity programs or other broad reform packages.    IMF-associated austerity 
programs have often resulted in popular unrest. 
21   I also tested the proposition that 
devaluations are acting as a statistical proxy for unpopular IMF austerity programs by 
conditioning the previous calculation on the adoption of IMF programs.   The IMF 
program variable does not seem to raise the frequency of leader job loss, relative to 
devaluations that did not involve an IMF program.
22    There is more support for the 
hypothesis that finance ministers and central bankers are likely to lose their jobs when a 
devaluation is perceived as violating previous public assurances to the contrary; but this 
only explains part of the effect.   The dominant reason appears to be that devaluations are 
indeed contractionary.    
 
  Empirical studies 
  Edwards (1986) and Acar (2000) found that devaluation in developing countries 
is contractionary in the first year, but then expansionary when exports and imports have 
had time to react to the enhanced price competiveness.  (In the very long run, devaluation 
is presumed neutral, as prices adjust and all real effects disappear.)   Bahmani-Oskooee 
(2006) also found some evidence of contractionary effects.     For the countries hit by the 
East Asia crisis of 1997-98, Upadhyaya (1999) found that devaluation was at best neutral 
in the long run, while Chou and Chao (2001) found a contractionary effect in the short 
run.  Ahmed, et al. (2002) find that contractionary devaluations are a property of 
developing countries in particular.  Rajan and Shen (2006) find that devaluations are only 
contractionary in crisis situations, which they attribute to debt composition issues.   
  Connolly (1983) and Kamin (1988) did not find contractionary effects.   
Nunnenkamp and Schweickert (1990) rejected the hypothesis of contraction on a sample 
                                                 
20 Stein and Streb (1998).        
21 For example, riots following food-subsidy cutbacks contributed to the overthrow of President Nimeiri of 
Sudan in 1985. Edwards and Santaella (1993) report nine cases of post-devaluation coup attempts, in a 
study that looks at the role of IMF presence along with various measures of political instability in 
determining whether devaluations during the period 1950-1971 were economically successful.
   Lora and 
Olivera (2004) find that voters punish presidents for pro-market policies and for increases in the rate of 
inflation, but not for exchange rate policies per se.     For an earlier summary of the political consequences 
of IMF-type austerity programs, see Bienen and Gersovitz (1985). 
22 Conditioning on the IMF dummy variable has no discernible effect on the frequency of leader turnover.  
Either with or without an IMF program, the frequency of job loss following devaluations is about 20%, 
almost double the rate in normal times.   11
of 48 countries, except during the first year in the case of manufactured exports (as 
opposed to agricultural).  Some who find no negative correlation attribute the findings of 
those who do to the influence of third factors such as contemporaneous expenditure-
reducing policies.     
Confirming a new phenomenon, Calvo and Reinhart (2001) found that exports do 
not increase at all after a devaluation, but rather fall for the first eight months.   Perhaps 
firms in emerging market crises lose access to working capital and trade credit even when 
they are in the export business.    
 
Effects via price pass-through 
  Through what channels might devaluation have contractionary effects?     Several 
of the most important contractionary effects of an increase in the exchange rate are 
hypothesized to work through a corresponding increase in the domestic price of imports, 
or of some larger set of goods.    Indeed, rapid pass-through of exchange rate changes to 
the prices of traded goods is the defining assumption of the “small open economy 
model,” which has always been thought to apply fairly well to emerging market 
countries.   The contractionary effect would then follow in any of several ways.  The 
higher prices of traded goods could, for example, reduce real incomes of workers and 
therefore real consumption.
23  Or they could increase costs to producers in the non-traded 
goods sector, coming from either higher costs of imported inputs such as oil or higher 
labor costs if wages are indexed to the cost of living.
24   Krugman and Taylor (1978) 
added increased tariff revenue to the list of ways in which devaluation might be 
contractionary.
25    The higher price level could also be contractionary through the “real 
balance effect,” which is a decline in the real money supply.  The tightening of real 
monetary conditions, which typically shows up as an increase in the interest rate, could 
then exert its contractionary effect either via the demand side or via the supply side.
26 
These mechanisms were not much in evidence in the currency crashes of the 
1990s.    The reason is that the devaluations were not rapidly passed through to higher 
prices for imports, for domestic competing goods, or to the CPI in the way that the small 
open economy model had led us to believe.  The failure of high inflation to materialize in 
East Asia after the 1997-98 devaluations, or even in Argentina after the 2001 devaluation, 
was good news.   But it called for greater scrutiny of the assumption that developing 
countries were subject to complete and instantaneous pass-through.
27     
                                                 
23  Diaz-Alejandro (1963) identified a loss in aggregate demand coming from a transfer of income from 
(low-saving) urban workers who consume traded goods, to (high-saving) rich owners of agricultural land.   
Barbone and  Rivera-Batiz (1987) point the finger at profits of firms owned by foreign investors. 
24  References include Corbo (1985) for the context of Chile in 1981, Solimano (1985) on wage indexation, 
Agénor (1991) on intermediate inputs, and Hanson (1983) on both imported inputs and indexed wages.  
25  Cooper (1971) provided the original compendium of ways in which devaluation could be contractionary.  
Montiel and Lizondo (1989) and Morley (1992) present analytical overviews. 
26 Williamson (1991) argued that Poland’s “shock therapy” of 1990 was an example of the contractionary 
effect of devaluation on demand.  Van Wijnbergen (1986) introduced a contractionary effect on the supply 
side:   firms in developing countries are known often to be dependent on working capital as a factor of 
production, and devaluation reduces the availability of that working capital. 
27 Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005) locate the slow adjustment to the overall price level in the non-
traded sector.   Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2005) attribute slow adjustment to the insulation between dock 
prices of imported goods and retail prices created by distribution costs.   12
 
Balance sheet effect from currency mismatch 
  Balance sheet effects have become easily the most important of the various 
possible contractionary effects of devaluation.  Banks and other firms in emerging 
markets often  incur debt denominated in foreign currency, even while much of their 
revenues are in domestic currency.  This situation is known as currency mismatch.   
When currency mismatch is combined with a major devaluation, otherwise-solvent firms 
have trouble servicing their debts.   They may have to lay off workers and close plants, or 
go bankrupt altogether.   Such weak balance sheets have increasingly been fingered in 
many models, not only as the major contractionary effect in a devaluation, but also as a 
fundamental cause of currency crises in the first place.
28     
  A number of empirical studies have documented the balance sheet effect, in 
particular the finding that the combination of foreign-currency debt plus devaluation is 
indeed contractionary.  Cavallo, Kisselev, Perri and Roubini (2004) find that the 
magnitude of recession is related to the product of dollar debt and percentage 
devaluation.  Bebczuk, Galindo and Panizza (2006) find that devaluation is only 
contractionary for the one-fifth of developing countries with a ratio of external dollar 
debt  to GDP in excess of  84%;   it is expansionary for the rest. 
29  
 
Why do debtor countries develop weak balance sheets in the first place?  What is 
the origin of the currency mismatch?    There are four theories.   First, so-called 
“Original sin:”  Investors in high-income countries are unwilling to acquire exposure in 
the currencies of developing countries.
30      Second, adjustable currency pegs:  an 
apparently fixed exchange rate lulls borrowers into a false sense of security and so into 
incurring excessive unhedged dollar liabilities.
31  Third, moral hazard:  borrowing in 
dollars is a way for well-connected locals to put the risk of a bad state of nature onto the 
government, to the extent the authorities have reserves or other claims to foreign 
exchange.
32     
                                                 
28 The analytical literature on balance sheet effects and output contraction includes, but is not limited to: 
Caballero and Krishnamurty (2002), Calvo, Izquierdo, & Talvi (2003), Cespedes, Chang and Velasco 
(2000, 2003),  Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2003, 2004), Chang and Velasco (1999), Christiano, Gust 
and Roldos (2002),  Cook (2004), Dornbusch (2002), Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2005), Krugman (1999), 
Mendoza (2002), and Schneider and  Tornell (2004). 
29  Calvo, Izquierdo and Meija (2004), using a sample of 32 developed and developing countries,  find that 
openness,  understood as a large supply of tradable goods, reduces the vulnerability of a given current 
account deficit, so that lack of openness coupled with liability dollarization are key determinants of the 
probability of Sudden Stops.    Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003) and Cavallo and Frankel (2008), too, 
stress that the required change in relative prices is larger the more closed an economy is in terms of its 
supply of tradable goods. 
30 The phrase was coined by Ricardo Hausmann, and was intended to capture the frustrating position of a 
policy-maker whose policies had been fated by history to suffer the curse of currency mismatch before he 
even took office. E.g., Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) and Hausmann and Panizza (2003).  Velasco 
(2001) is skeptical of the position that original sin deprives policy makers of monetary independence 
regardless of the exchange rate regime.   Goldstein and Turner (2004) point out things countries can do to 
reduce currency mismatch. 
31 Hausmann and Panizza (2003), however, find no empirical support for an effect of exchange rate regime 
on original sin, only country size.               
32 E.g., Dooley (2000a); Krugman (1999); and Wei and Wu (2002).   13
Fourth,  procrastination of adjustment:  when the balance of payments turns 
negative, shifting to short-term and dollar-denominated debt are ways the government 
can retain the affections of foreign investors and thus postpone adjustment.
33  These 
mechanisms, along with running down reserves and staking ministerial credibility on 
holding a currency peg, are part of a strategy that is sometimes called “gambling for 
resurrection.”  What they have in common, beyond achieving the desired delay, is 
helping to make the crisis worse when it does come, if it comes.
34   It is harder to restore 
confidence after a devaluation if reserves are near zero and the ministers have lost 
personal credibility.   Further, if the composition of the debt has shifted toward the short 
term, in maturity, and toward the dollar, in denomination, then restoring external balance 
is likely to wreak havoc with private balance sheets regardless the combination of 
increases in interest rate versus increases in exchange rate. 
 We return to these issues when considering emerging market financial crises in 
section 8 of this survey.           
 
 
 
3. Inflation  
 
3.1  High Inflation Episodes 
 
Hyperinflation is defined by a threshold in the rate of increase in prices of  50% per 
month by one definition, 1000% per year by another.
35  The first two clusters of 
hyperinflationary episodes in the 20
th century came at the ends of World War I and World 
War II, respectively.  The third could be said to have come at the end the Cold War:  in 
Latin America, Central Africa, and Eastern Europe.
36 
Receiving more scholarly attention, however, have been the numerous episodes of 
inflation that, while quite high, did not qualify as hyperinflation.  As Fischer, Sahay and 
Vegh (2002) wrote: 
“Since 1947, hyperinflations … in market economies have been rare. Much more common have 
been longer inflationary processes with inflation rates above 100 percent per annum. Based on a 
sample of 133 countries, and using the 100 percent threshold as the basis for a definition of very 
high inflation episodes, … we find that (i) close to 20 percent of countries have experienced 
inflation above 100 percent per annum; (ii) higher inflation tends to be more unstable; (iii) in high 
inflation countries, the relationship between the fiscal balance and seigniorage is strong… (iv) 
inflation inertia decreases as average inflation rises; (v) high inflation is associated with poor 
macroeconomic performance; and (vi) stabilizations from high inflation that rely on the exchange 
rate as the nominal anchor are expansionary.” 
 
Dornbusch and Fischer (1993), after the distinction between hyperinflation and high 
inflation, also made a distinction between high inflation episodes and moderate inflation 
episodes.    The dividing line between moderate and high inflation is drawn at 40%.  The 
                                                 
33 In other words, a country without a serious currency mismatch problem may develop one just in the year 
after a sudden stop in capital inflows but before the ultimate currency crash.  Frankel (2005).     
34 This helps explain why the ratio of short-term foreign debt to reserves appears so often and so robustly in 
the literature on early warning indicators for currency crashes, discussed in Section 8 of the chapter. 
35 Dornbusch,  Sturzenegger and Wolf  (1977); Sachs (1987). 
36Dornbusch and Fischer (1986).   14
traditional hypothesis is of course that monetary expansion and inflation elicit higher 
output and employment – provided the expansion is an acceleration from the past or a 
departure from expectations.   In any case, at high rates of inflation this relationship 
breaks down, and the detrimental effects of price instability on growth dominate, perhaps 
via a disruption of the usefulness of price signals for the allocation of output.
37  Bruno 
and Easterly (1998) found that periods during which inflation is above the 40% threshold 
tend to be associated with significantly lower real growth .                     
 
Why do countries choose policies that lead to high inflation, given the detrimental 
effects?  Seignorage or the inflation tax is one explanation.    Dynamic inconsistency (low 
credibility) of government pledges to follow non-inflationary rates of money growth is 
another.    
As Edwards (1994) pointed out, the modeling approach has shifted away from 
starting with an exogenous rate of money growth, and instead seeks to endogenize 
monetary policy by means of political economy and public finance.   According to 
Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992), for example, countries with polarized and 
unstable political structure find it hard to collect taxes, and so are more likely to have to 
resort to seignorage. Fischer (1982) found that some countries collect seignorage worth 
10% of total government finance.  The public finance problem is worsened by the 
Olivera-Tanzi effect:  because of lags in tax collection, disinflation reduces the real value 
of tax receipts.   Catao and Terrones (2005) found evidence for the inflation tax view:  
developing economies display a significant positive long-run effect on inflation of the 
fiscal deficit when it is scaled by narrow money (the inflation tax base).  Easterly, Mauro 
and Scmidt-Hebbel (1995) pursued the Cagan logic that high inflation arises when the 
needed revenue exceeds that corresponding to the seignorage-maximizing rate of money 
growth. 
 
3.2 Inflation stabilization programs 
 
  In almost all developing countries, inflation came down substantially during the 
1990s, though many had previously undergone several unsuccessful attempts at 
stabilization before succeeding.    High-inflation countries often had national indexation 
of wages and other nominal variables;  removing the indexation arrangements was 
usually part of the successful stabilization programs.
38 
 
In theoretical models that had become popular with monetary economists in the 
1980s, a change to a credibly firm nominal anchor would fundamentally change 
expectations so that all inflation, in traded and non-traded goods alike, would disappear, 
without loss of output in the transition. This property has not been the historical 
experience, however.   Stabilization is usually difficult.
 39 
                                                 
37 E.g., Fischer (1991, 1993). 
38 E.g., Fischer (1986, 1988). 
39 E.g., Dornbusch  (1991).   15
Where excessive money growth is rooted in the government’s need to finance 
itself by seignorage, one reason stabilization attempts are likely to fail is if they don’t 
address the underlying fiscal problem.
40    
Inflation inertia is another explanation.  Calvo and Vegh (1998) reviewed the 
literature on attempts to stabilize from high inflation and why they so often failed.   
Exchange-rate based stabilization attempts generally show a lot of inflation inertia.
41  As 
a result of the inertia, producers gradually lose price competitiveness on world markets in 
the years after the exchange rate target is adopted.      Calvo and Vegh (1994) thus found 
that the recessionary effects associated with disinflation appear in the late stages of 
exchange rate-based programs. This is by contrast with money-based programs, in which 
recessionary effects show up early, as a result of tight monetary policy. 
A third explanation for failed stabilization attempts is that the declaration of a 
money target or an exchange rate peg is not a completely credible commitment: the 
policy can easily be changed in the future.  Thus the proclamation of a rule is not a 
sufficient solution to the dynamic consistency problem.
42   Some attribute inertia of 
inflation and the loss of output during the transitions to the  imperfect credibility of such 
targets, and thus urge institutional restrictions that are still more binding, for example, 
dollarization in place of Argentina’s failed quasi-currency-board.  But there can be no 
more credibly firm nominal anchor than full dollarization.   Yet when Ecuador gave up 
its currency in favor of the dollar, neither the inflation rate nor the price level converged 
rapidly to US levels.   Inflationary momentum, rather, continued. 
 
3.3  Central Bank Independence 
 
 The characteristics of underdeveloped institutions and low inflation-fighting 
credibility that are common afflictions among developing countries standardly lead to 
two prescriptions for monetary policy: that it is particularly important (i) that their central 
banks should have independence
43 and (ii) that they should make regular public 
commitments to a transparent and monitorable nominal target.     These two areas, 
independence and targets, are considered in this and subsequent sections, respectively. 
 
  A number of emerging market countries have followed the lead of industrialized 
countries, and given their central banks legal independence.    In Latin America the trend 
began with Chile, Colombia , Mexico, and Venezuela in the 1990s.
44     The Bank of 
Korea was made independent in 1998, following that country’s currency crisis.  Many 
other developing countries have moved in the same direction.
45 
                                                 
40 Cukeriman (2008);  Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2006).  Sachs (1987) argued that Bolivia’s 1985 
stabilization achieved credibility because the budget gap was closed. 
41 E.g., Kiguel and  Liviatan (1992 ) and Uribe (1997).     
42 The originators of the dynamic consistency analysis were Barro and Gordon (1983), Calvo (1988), and 
Kydland and Prescott (1977).  
43 E.g., Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2002). 
44 Junguito and Vargas (1996). 
45 Arnone, Laurens  and Segalotto (2006).    16
 
There are also some skeptics, however.  Mas (1995) argues that central bank 
independence won’t be helpful if a country’s political economy dictates budget deficits 
regardless of monetary policy.   Landström (2008) finds little effect from CBI.   
 
 
4.   Nominal targets for monetary policy 
 
The principle of commitment to a nominal anchor in itself says nothing about 
what economic variables are best suited to play that role.    In a non-stochastic model, any 
nominal variable is as good a choice for monetary target as any other nominal variable.  
But in a stochastic model, not to mention the real world, it makes quite a difference what 
is the nominal variable toward which the monetary authorities publicly commit in 
advance.
 46     Should it be the money supply?   Exchange rate?   CPI?   Other 
alternatives?   The ex ante choice will carry big ex post implications for such important 
variables as real income.     
                                                 
46 Rogoff (1985) may be the best reference for the familiar point that the choice of nominal target ex ante 
makes a big difference in the presence of ex post shocks. 
Does institutional insulation of the central bank from political pressure help to 
bring down inflation, at lower cost to output than otherwise?   Cukierman, Webb and 
Neyapti (1992) lay out three measures of Central Bank Independence (CBI) and present 
the resultant indices for 72 countries.   As with currency regimes (section 5.4 of the 
chapter), it is not necessarily enough to look at whether the central bank has de jure or 
legal independence.   The three indices are: legal independence, turnover of governors of 
central banks, and an index derived from a questionnaire that the authors had asked 
monetary policy makers fill out.   The authors find that de jure status is sufficient -- legal 
measures are important determinants of low inflation -- in  developed countries, but not 
in developing countries. Conversely, turnover of central bank governors is strongly 
correlated with inflation in developing countries.  The implication is that independence is 
important for all, but the distinction between de jure independence and de facto 
independence is necessary in developing countries.   Haan and Kooi (2000),  in a sample 
of 82 countries in the 1980s, including some with very high inflation, find that CBI as 
measured by governor turnover can reduce inflation.  Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti 
(2002) report that the countries in transition out of socialism in the 1990s made their 
central banks independent, which eventually helped bring down inflation.   
Crowe and Meade (2008) examine CBI in an updated data set with a broad 
sample of countries.  They find that increases in CBI have tended to occur in more 
democratic countries and in countries with high levels of past inflation.  Their study has a 
time series dimension, beyond the usual cross section, and uses instrumental variable 
estimation to seek to address the thorny problem that CBI might not be causally related to 
low inflation, if both result from a third factor (political priority on low inflation).    The 
finding:  greater CBI is associated with lower inflation.    Gutiérez (2003) and  Jácome 
and Vázquez (2008) also find a negative statistical relationship between central bank 
independence and inflation among Latin American and Caribbean countries.   Haan, 
Masciandaro, and Quintyn (2008) find that central bank independence lowers the mean 
and variance of inflation with no effect on the mean and variance of output growth.    17
Inflation, the exchange rate, and the money supply are all well-represented among 
developing countries’ choices of nominal targets.
47   The choice of what variable should 
serve as nominal anchor is explored next. 
 
4.1 The move from money targeting to exchange rate targeting 
 
Inflation peaked in the median emerging market country overall around 1990, 
about ten years behind the peak in industrialized countries..    
Many developing countries attempted to bring down high inflation rates in the 
1980s, but most of these stabilization programs failed.  Some were based on orthodox 
money growth targets.  Enthusiasm for monetarism largely died out by the end of 
the1980s, perhaps because M1 targets had recently proven unrealistically restrictive in 
the largest industrialized countries.   Even from the viewpoint of the proverbial 
conservative central banker who cares only about inflation, public promises to hit targets 
that cannot usually be fulfilled subsequently will do little to establish credibility.  The 
Bundesbank had enough credibility that a long record of proclaiming M1 targets and then 
missing them did little to undermine its conservative reputation or expectations of low 
inflation in Germany.   Developing countries in general do not enjoy the same luxury. 
  
When improved price stability was finally achieved in countries that had 
undergone very high inflation and repeated failed stabilization attempts in the 1980s, the 
exchange rate was usually the nominal anchor around which the successful stabilization 
programs were built.
48  Examples include Chile’s tablita, Bolivia’s exchange rate target, 
Israel’s stabilization, Argentina’s convertibility plan, and Brazil’s real plan.  (The 
advantages, and disadvantages of fixed exchange rates for emerging markets are 
discussed in section 5.)   
But matters continued to evolve subsequently. 
 
4.2 The move from exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting 
 
The series of emerging market currency crises that began in December 1994 and 
ended in January 2002 all involved the abandonment of exchange rate targets, in favor of 
more flexible currency regimes, if not outright floating.     In many countries, the 
abandonment of a cherished exchange rate anchor for monetary policy took place under 
the urgent circumstances of a speculative attack (including Mexico and Argentina).   A 
few countries made the jump to floating preemptively, before a currency crisis could hit 
(Chile and Colombia).    Only a very few smaller countries responded to the ever rougher 
seas of international financial markets by moving in the opposite direction, to full 
dollarization (Ecuador) or currency boards (Bulgaria). 
From the longer-term perspective of the four decades since 1971, the general 
trend has been in favor of floating exchange rates.
49    But if the exchange rate is not to be 
the nominal anchor, then some other variable should play this role.
50 
                                                 
47 Mishkin and Savastano (2002). 
48 Atkeson and Kehoe (2001) argue that money targeting does not allow the public to monitor central bank 
behavior as well as exchange rate targeting does.  
49 Collins (1996); Larrain and Velasco ( 2001); Chang and Velasco (2000).   18
 
With exchange rate targets tarnished by the end of the 1990s, monetarism out of 
favor, and the gold standard having earlier been relegated to the scrap heap of history, 
there was a clear vacancy for the position of Preferred Nominal Anchor.     The regime of 
Inflation Targeting (IT) was a fresh young face, coming with an already-impressive 
resumé of recent successes in wealthier countries (New Zealand, Canada, United 
Kingdom, and Sweden).     IT got the job.   Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico switched 
from exchange rate targets to Inflation Targeting in 1999,
51 the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland about the same time, as well as Israel, Korea, South Africa, and Thailand.  
Mexico followed in 2000, then Indonesia and Romania in 2005 and Turkey in 2006.
52 
 
In many ways, Inflation Targeting has functioned well.    It apparently anchored 
expectations and avoided a return to inflation in Brazil, for example, despite two severe 
challenges: the 50% depreciation of early 1999, as the country exited from the real plan, 
and the similarly large depreciation of 2002, when a presidential candidate who at the 
time was considered anti-market and inflationary pulled ahead in the polls.
53   Gonçalves 
and Salles (2008) found that emerging market countries that had adopted inflation 
targeting had enjoyed greater declines in inflation and less growth volatility. 
  
One might argue, however, that  the events of 2007-2009  put strains on the 
Inflation Targeting regime in the way that the events of 1994-2001 had earlier put strains 
on the regime of exchange rate targeting.    Three other kinds of nominal variables have 
forced their way into the attentions of central bankers, beyond the CPI.   One nominal 
variable, the exchange rate, never really left – certainly not for the smaller countries.    A 
second category of nominal variables, prices of agricultural and mineral products, is 
particularly relevant for many developing countries.  The greatly heightened volatility of 
commodity prices in the 2000s decade, culminating in the spike of 2008, resurrected 
arguments about the desirability of a currency regime that accommodates terms of trade 
shocks.  A third category,   prices of assets such as equities and real estate, has been 
especially relevant in industrialized countries, but not just there.
54    The international 
financial upheaval that began in mid-2007 with the US sub-prime mortgage crisis has 
forced central bankers everywhere to re-think their exclusive focus on inflation to the 
exclusion of asset prices.   
Proponents of IT have always left themselves the loophole of conceding that 
central banks should pay attention to other variables such as exchange rates, asset prices, 
and commodity prices to the extent that they portend future inflation.  In many of the last 
century’s biggest bubbles and crashes, however, monetary policy that in retrospect had 
been too expansionary pre-crisis never showed up as goods inflation, only as asset 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 Baillu, Lafrance and Perrault (2003) and Svensson (2000) emphasized this point. 
51 Loayza and Soto (2002) and Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002).   (Chile had started announcing 
inflation targets earlier, but kept a BBC exchange rate regime until 1999.) 
52 Rose (2007). 
53  Giavazzi, Goldfajn, and Herrera (2005). 
54  Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006),
 Edison, Luangaram, and Miller (2000), Aizenman and  Jinjarak 
(2009) and Mendoza and Terrones (2008) explore how credit booms lead to rising asset prices in emerging 
markets, often preceded by capital inflows and followed by financial crises.     19
inflation.  Central bankers tend to insist that it is not the job of monetary policy to address 
asset prices. E.g., De Gregorio (2009) makes the point that asset bubbles can be 
addressed with tools other than monetary policy.  
Fraga, Goldfajn and Minella (2003) found that inflation-targeting central banks in 
emerging market countries miss their declared targets by far more than they do in 
industrialized countries.  Most analysis of Inflation Targeting is better suited to large 
industrialized countries than to developing countries, in several respects.
55   First, the 
theoretical models usually do not feature a role for exogenous shocks in trade conditions 
or difficulties in the external accounts.      The theories tend to assume that countries need 
not worry about financing trade deficits internationally, presumably because international 
capital markets function well enough to smooth consumption in the face of external 
shocks.   But for developing countries, international capital markets often exacerbate 
external shocks, rather than the opposite.  Booms, featuring capital inflows, excessive 
currency overvaluation and associated current account deficits are often followed by 
busts, featuring sudden stops in inflows, abrupt depreciation, and recession.
56   An 
analysis of alternative monetary policies that did not take into account the international 
financial crises of 1982, 1994-2001 or 2008-09, would not be useful to policy makers in 
emerging market countries.      
 
Capital flows are prone to exacerbate fluctuations in particular when the source of 
the fluctuations is trade shocks.  This observation leads us to the next relevant respect in 
which developing countries differ from industrialized countries. 
 
IT can be vulnerable to the consequences of supply shocks, which tend to be 
larger for developing countries for reasons already noted in Section 1.   As has been 
shown by a variety of authors, Inflation Targeting (defined narrowly) is not robust with 
respect to supply shocks.
57    Under strict IT, to prevent the price index from rising in the 
face of an adverse supply shock, monetary policy must tighten so much that the entire 
brunt of the fall in nominal GDP is borne by real GDP.    Most reasonable objective 
functions would, instead, tell the monetary authorities to allow part of the temporary 
shock to show up as an increase in the price level.    Of course this is precisely the reason 
why many IT proponents favor flexible inflation targeting, often in the form of the Taylor 
Rule, which does indeed call for the central bank to share the pain between inflation and 
output.
58  It is also a reason for pointing to the “core” CPI rather than “headline” CPI. 
                                                 
55 This is not to forget the many studies of inflation targeting for emerging market and developing 
countries, most of them favorable.   Savastano (2000) offered a concise summary of much of the research 
as of that date. Amato and Gerlach (2002) and Masson, Savastano, and Sharma (1997) argued that IT can 
be good for emerging markets, but only after certain conditions such as freedom from fiscal dominance are 
satisfied.   Batini and  Laxton (2006) argue that pre-conditions have not been necessary.  Laxton and 
Pesenti (2003) conclude that because central banks in emerging market countries (such as Czechoslovakia) 
tend to have lower credibility, they need to move the interest rate more strongly in response to movements 
in forecasted inflation than a rich country would.   Others include Debelle (2001);  De Gregrio (2009); 
Goodfriend and Prasad (2007);  Hammond, Kanbur, Prasad (2009); Jonas and Mishkin (2005); Mishkin 
(2000; 2008); and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007).    
56 Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2005); Reinhart and Reinhart (2009); Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and 
Talvi (1997).           
57Among other examples:  Frankel (1995b) and Frankel, Smit, and Sturzenegger (2007).   
58 E.g., Svensson (2000).   20
 
4.3 “Headline” CPI, Core CPI, and Nominal Income Targeting 
 
In practice, Inflation-Targeting central bankers usually respond to large temporary 
shocks in import prices for oil and other agricultural and mineral products as they should: 
by trying to exclude them from the measure of the CPI that is targeted.
59   Central banks 
have two approaches to doing this.   Some explain ex ante that their target for the year is 
inflation in the Core CPI, a measure that excludes volatile components, usually food and 
energy products.   The virtue of this approach is that the central banks are able to abide 
by their commitment to core CPI when the supply shock comes (assuming the supply 
shock is located in the farm or energy sectors; it doesn’t work, for example, if the shock 
is labor unrest or power failures that shut down urban activity).   The disadvantage of 
declaring core CPI as the official target is that the person in the street is less likely to 
understand it, compared to the simple CPI.   Transparency and communication of a target 
that the public can monitor are the original reasons for declaring a specific nominal target 
in the first place.   
The alternative approach is to talk about the CPI ex ante, but then in the face of an 
adverse supply shock explain ex post that the increase in farm or energy prices is being 
excluded due to special circumstances.   This strategy is questionable from the standpoint 
of credibility.   The people in the street are told that they shouldn’t be concerned by the 
increase in the CPI because it is “only” occurring in the prices of filling up their car fuel 
tanks and buying their weekly groceries.  Either way, ex ante or ex post, the effort to 
explain away supply-induced fluctuations in the CPI undermines the credibility of the 
monetary authorities.  This credibility problem is especially severe in countries where 
there are grounds for suspecting that government officials already fiddle with the 
consumer price indices for political purposes. 
 
One variable that fits the desirable characteristics of a nominal target is nominal 
GDP.   Nominal income targeting is a regime that has the attractive property of taking 
supply shocks partly as P and partly as Y, without forcing the central bank to abandon the 
declared nominal anchor.   It was popular with macroeconomists in the 1980s.
60   Some 
claimed it was less applicable to developing countries because of long lags and large 
statistical errors in measurement.  But these measurement problems are smaller than they 
used to be.   Furthermore, the fact that developing countries are more vulnerable to 
supply shocks than are industrialized countries suggests that the proposal to target 
nominal income is more applicable to them, not less, as McKibbin and Singh (2003) have 
pointed out.        
  
In any case, and for whatever reason, nominal income targeting has not been 
seriously considered since the 1990s, either by rich countries or poor.  
 
                                                 
59  Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006) show theoretically, advantages of targeting non-traded goods to the 
extent that exchange rate pass-through is high (as in section 2.1). 
60 It was easier to see the superiority of nominal GDP targeting when the status quo was M1 targeting .  
(The proposal for nominal income targeting might have been better received by central banks if it had been 
called “Velocity-Shift-Adjusted Money Targeting.”)     21
5. Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Many Inflation-Targeting central banks in developing countries have all along put 
more emphasis on the exchange rate than they officially admitted.   This tendency is the 
famous Fear of Floating of Reinhart (2000) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000, 2002).
61  
When booming markets for their export commodities put upward pressure on their 
currencies (2003-2008), they intervene to dampen appreciation.   Then, when crisis hits, 
the country may intervene  to dampen the depreciation of their currencies.   Central banks 
still do – and should – pay a lot of attention to their exchange rates.   The point applies to 
the entire spectrum from managed floaters to peggers.  Fixed exchange rates are still an 
option to be considered for many countries, especially small ones.
62    
 
5.1 The advantages of fixed exchange rates 
 
For very small countries, full dollarization remains one option, or joining the 
euro, for those in Europe.  The success of EMU has inspired regional groupings of 
developing countries in various parts of the world to discuss the possibility of trying to 
follow a similar path.
63 
 
  Fixed exchange rates have many advantages, in addition to their use as a nominal 
anchor for monetary policy.    They reduce transactions costs and exchange risk, which in 
turn facilitates international trade and investment.   This is especially true for 
institutionally locked-in arrangements, such as currency boards
64 and dollarization.
65   
Influential research by Rose (2000) and others over the last decade has shown that fixed 
exchange rates and, especially, monetary unions for developing countries, increase trade 
and investment substantially.   In addition fixed exchange rates avoid the speculative 
bubbles to which floating exchange rates are occasionally subject.    
 
5.2 The advantages of floating exchange rates 
 
Of course fixed exchange rates have disadvantages too.   Most importantly, to the 
extent financial markets are integrated, a fixed exchange rate means giving up monetary 
independence;  the central bank can’t increase the money supply, lower the interest rate, 
or devalue the currency, in response to a downturn in demand for its output.    
  It has been argued that developing countries have misused monetary discretion 
more often than they have used it to achieve the textbook objectives.    But a second 
disadvantage of a fixed rate presupposes no discretionary abilities:  it means giving up the 
                                                 
61  Among the possible reasons for aversion to floating, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) emphasize high pass-
through and contractionary depreciations. 
62 Meanwhile, in response to the global financial crisis of 2007-09, small countries on the periphery of 
Europe felt newly attracted to the idea of rapid adoption of the euro (Iceland and some Central European 
countries).    
63 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) and Levy Yeyati and Sturzennegger (2000) apply OCA criteria to a 
number of relevant regions.  Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1999) and Goto and Hamada (1994) for Asia. 
64 Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2000), Hanke and Schuler (1995) and Williamson (1995).   
65 Calvo (2002) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001).   22
automatic accommodation to supply shocks that floating gives,
66 especially trade shocks: 
a depreciation when world market conditions for the export commodity weaken, and vice 
versa.
67      Berg, Borensztein, and Mauro (2003) say it well: 
“Another characteristic of a well-functioning floating exchange rate is that it responds 
appropriately to external shocks. When the terms of trade decline, for example, it makes sense for 
the country’s nominal exchange rate to weaken, thereby facilitating the required relative price 
adjustment.  Emerging market floating exchange rate countries do, in fact, react in this way to 
negative terms of trade shocks. In a large sample of developing countries over the past three 
decades, countries that have fixed exchange rate regimes and that face negative terms of trade 
shocks achieve real exchange rate depreciations only with a lag of two years while suffering large 
real GDP declines. By contrast, countries with floating rates display large nominal and real 
depreciations on impact and later suffer some inflation but much smaller output losses.” 
 
Besides the inability to respond monetarily to shocks, there are three more 
disadvantages of rigidity in exchange rate arrangements.   It can impair the central bank’s 
lender of last resort capabilities in the event of a crisis in the banking sector, as Argentina 
demonstrated in 2001.  It entails a loss of seignorage, especially for a country that goes 
all the way to dollarization.    For a country that stops short of full dollarization, pegged 
exchange rates are occasionally subject to unprovoked speculative attacks (of the 
“second-generation” type
68). 
Some who see costly speculative attacks as originating in the maturity mismatch 
problem suggest that exchange rate variability is beneficial in that it forces borrowers to 
confront the risks of foreign-currency-denominated debt.  The warning is that the choice 
of an adjustable peg regime, or other intermediate exchange rate regime, leads to 
dangerously high unhedged foreign-currency borrowing.  It is argued that a floating 
regime would force borrowers to confront explicitly the existence of exchange rate risk, 
and thereby reduce unhedged foreign-currency borrowing.
69    This sounds like an 
argument that governments should introduce gratuitous volatility because private 
financial agents underestimate risk.   But some models establish this advantage of 
floating, even with rational expectations and only uncertainty that is generated only by 
fundamentals.
70   
 
5.3 Evaluating overall exchange rate regime choices 
 
  Econometric attempts to discern what sort of regime generically delivers the best 
economic performance across countries – firmly fixed, floating, or intermediate – have 
not been successful.   To pick three, Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2000) find that firm fixers 
perform the best, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) that floaters do the best, and 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that intermediate managed floats work the best!  Why the 
stark discrepancy?  One reason is differences in how the studies classify de facto 
                                                 
66 Ramcharan (2007) finds support for the advantage of floating in response to supply shocks, for the case 
of natural disasters. 
67 Among peggers, terms-of-trade shocks are amplified and long-run growth is reduced, as compared to 
flexible-rate countries, according to Edwards and Yeyati (2005). Also see  Broda (2004).   
68 Chang and  Velasco (1997).   The generations of speculative attack models are explained below. 
69 Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) and Eichengreen (1999, p. 105). 
70 Chamon and Hausmann (2005), Chang and Velasco (2004), Jeanne (2005), and Pathak and Tirole (2004)   23
exchange rate regimes.  (To be discussed in the next section.)   But another reason is that 
the virtues of alternative regimes depend on the circumstances of the country in question.    
No single exchange rate regime is right for all countries. 
A list of Optimum Currency Area criteria that qualify a country for a relatively firm 
fixed exchange rate, versus a more flexible rate, should include these eight 
characteristics:
71 
1.  Small size. 
2.  Openness, as reflected, for example, in the ratio of tradable goods to GDP.
72   The 
existence of a major-currency partner with whom bilateral trade, investment and 
other activities are already high, or are hoped to be high in the future, would also 
work in favor of a fixed rate.. 
3.  “Symmetry of shocks,” meaning high correlation of cyclical fluctuations 
(particularly demand shocks) in the home country and in the country that 
determines policy regarding the money to which pegging is contemplated.   This 
is important because, if the domestic country is to give up the ability to follow its 
own monetary policy, it is better if the interest rates chosen by the larger partner 
are more often close to those that the domestic country would have chosen 
anyway.
73  
4.  Labor mobility.
74 When monetary response to an asymmetric shock has been 
precluded, it is useful if workers can move from the high-unemployment country 
to the low-unemployment countries.   This is the primary mechanism of 
adjustment across states within the monetary union which is the United States. 
5.  Countercyclical remittances.   Emigrant’s remittances (i) constitute a large share 
of foreign exchange earnings in many developing countries, (ii) are variable, (iii) 
appear to be countercyclical.
75          That remittances apparently respond to the 
difference between the cyclical positions of the sending and receiving country, 
makes it a bit easier to give up the option of responding to shocks by setting 
monetary policies different from those of the partner. 
6.  Countercyclical fiscal transfers.   Within the United States, if one region suffers 
an economic downturn, the federal fiscal system cushions it; one estimate is that 
for every dollar fall in the income of a stricken state, disposable income falls by 
only an estimated 70 cents.  Such fiscal cushions are largely absent at the 
international level, with the possible exception of the role of France in the 
Communité Financière Afrique.   (Even where substantial transfers exist, they are 
rarely countercyclical.) 
                                                 
71  Four surveys offering a more complete discussion of the choice of exchange rate regime and further 
references are: Edwards ( 2002) ,  Edwards and Savastano (1999), Frankel (2004) and Rogoff (2004). 
72  The classic reference is McKinnon (1963).  
73 Mundell (1961); Eichengreen  (1999). 
74 The classic reference is Mundell (1961).     
75 Only the countercyclicality is in need of documentation.  Clarke and Wallstein (2004) find that 
remittance receipts go up in response to a natural disaster. Kapur (2003) finds that they go up in response to 
an economic downturn.  Yang and Choi (2007) find that they respond to rainfall-induced economic 
fluctuations.  Frankel (2009) finds that bilateral remittances respond to the differential in sender-receiver 
cyclical conditions. Some other authors, however, do not find evidence of such countercyclicality.    24
7.  Well-developed financial system.
76  
8.  Political willingness to give up some monetary sovereignty.     Some countries 
look on their currency with the same sense of patriotism with which they look on 
their flag.    
 
5.4 Categorizing exchange rate regimes 
 
It is by now well-known that attempts to categorize countries’ choice of regime 
(into fixed, floating, and intermediate) in practice differ from the official categorization. 
Countries that say they are floating, in reality often are not.
77   Countries that say they are 
fixed, in reality often are not.
78    Countries that say they have a Band Basket Crawl 
(BBC) regime, often do not.
79 
There are a variety of attempts to classify de facto regimes.  Some seek to infer 
the degree of exchange rate flexibility around the anchor; others seem to infer what is the 
anchor.
 80      Pure de facto studies look only at the times series of exchange rates and 
reserves
81; others pay more attention to other information, including what the country 
says.
82  Less well-known is that the de facto classification regimes do not agree among 
themselves.  The correlation of de facto classification attempts with each other is 
generally as low as the correlation with the IMF’s official classification scheme.
83 
  Indeed, neat categorization may not be possible at all. That Argentina was in the 
end forced to abandon its currency board, in 2001, also dramatizes the lesson that the 
choice of exchange rate regime is not as permanent or deep as had previously been 
thought.  The choice of exchange rate regime is more likely endogenous with respect to 
institutions, rather than the other way around.
84  
 
5.5 The Corners Hypothesis 
 
The “corners hypothesis” — that countries are, or should be, moving away from 
the intermediate regimes, in favor of either the hard peg corner or the floating corner — 
was proposed by Eichengreen (1993) and rapidly became the new conventional wisdom 
with the emerging market crises of the late 1990s.
85  But it never had a good theoretical 
                                                 
76 Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2005)and Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere, and Rogoff (2009) find that 
countries appear to benefit by having increasingly flexible exchange rate systems as they become richer 
and more financially developed. 
77 Calvo and Reinhart (2002). 
78 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). 
79 Frankel, Schmukler and Servén (2000), Frankel and Wei (2007). 
80 Frankel and Wei (2008). 
81 These include Calvo and Reinhart (2000, 2002), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001, 2003a,b, 2005), 
and Shambaugh (2004). 
82 These include Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2000, 2002) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2003, 2004). 
83 Benassy et al (2004) and Frankel (2004). 
84 Alesina and Wagner (2003) and Calvo and Mishkin (2003). 
85 Fischer (2001), Council on Foreign Relations (1999), and Meltzer (2000).   25
foundation.
86    It subsequently lost popularity.   Perhaps it is another casualty of the 
realization that no regime choice is in reality permanent, and that investors know that.
87  
In any case, many countries continue to follow intermediate regimes such as band-basket-
crawl, and do not seem any the worse for it. 
 
6.  Procyclicality 
 
As noted in the introduction, one structural feature that tends to differentiate 
developing countries from industrialized countries is the magnitude of cyclical 
fluctuations.   This is in part due to the role of factors that “should” moderate the cycle, 
but in practice seldom do that.  If anything, they tend to exacerbate booms and busts  
instead: procyclical capital flows,  procyclical monetary and fiscal policy, and the related 
Dutch Disease.   The hope that improved policies or institutions might reduce this 
procyclicality makes this one of the most potentially fruitful avenues of research in 
emerging market macroeconomics. 
 
6.1 The procyclicality of capital flows in developing countries 
 
  According to the theory of intertemporal optimization, countries should borrow 
during temporary downturns, to sustain consumption and investment, and should repay or 
accumulate net foreign assets during temporary upturns.  In practice, it does not tend to 
work this way.  Capital flows are more often procyclical than countercyclical.
88  Most 
theories to explain this involve imperfections in capital markets, such as asymmetric 
information or the need for collateral.   Aguiar and Gopinath (2006, 2007), however, 
demonstrate that the observation of procyclical current accounts in developing countries 
might be explained in an optimizing model if shocks take the form of changes in the 
permanent trend of productivity rather than temporary cyclical deviations from trend.  
One interpretation of procyclical capital flows is that they result from procyclical 
fiscal policy:  when governments increase spending in booms, some of the deficit is 
financed by borrowing from abroad.   When they are forced to cut spending in 
downturns, it is to repay some of the excessive debt that the incurred during the upturn.     
Another interpretation of procyclical capital flows to developing countries is that they 
pertain especially to exporters of agricultural and mineral commodities, especially oil.    
We consider procyclical fiscal policy in the next sub-section, and the commodity cycle 
(Dutch disease) in the one after. 
 
6.2 The procyclicality of demand policy 
 
The procyclicality of fiscal policy 
                                                 
86 The feeling that an intermediate degree of exchange rate flexibility is inconsistent with perfect capital 
mobility is a misinterpretation of the principle of the Impossible Trinity.  To take a clear example, 
Krugman (1991) shows theoretically that a target zone is entirely compatible with uncovered interest parity.  
Williamson (1996, 2001) favors intermediate exchange rate regimes for emerging markets. 
87 Reinhart and Reinhart (2003). 
88  Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2005); Reinhart and Reinhart (2009); Perry (2009); Gavin, Hausmann, 
Perotti and Talvi (1996); and Mendoza and Terrones (2008).   26
Various authors have documented that fiscal policy tends to be procyclical in 
developing countries, in comparison with industrialized countries.
89    Most studies look 
at the procyclicality of government spending, because tax receipts are particularly 
endogenous with respect to the business cycle.   Indeed, an important reason for 
procyclical spending is precisely that government receipts from taxes or royalities rise in 
booms, and the government cannot resist the temptation or political pressure to increase 
spending proportionately, or even more than proportionately. 
 
The political business cycle 
The political business cycle is the hypothesized tendency of governments to adopt 
expansionary fiscal policies, and often monetary policies as well, in election years.  In 
this context, the fiscal expansion takes the form of tax cuts as easily as spending 
increases. The theory was originally designed with advanced countries in mind.  Some 
comprehensive empirical studies find evidence that the political budget cycle is present in 
both developed and less-developed countries. But developing countries are thought to be 
even more susceptible to the political business cycle than advanced countries.
90    
One interpretation is that institutions such as constitutional separation of powers 
in the budget process are necessary to resist procyclical fiscal policy, and these 
institutions are more often lacking in developing countries.
91   Brender and Drazen (2005) 
offer another interpretation:  the finding of a political budget cycle in a large cross-
section of countries is driven by the experience of ‘‘new democracies’’ – most of which 
are developing or transition countries  -- where fiscal manipulation by the incumbent 
government succeeds politically because voters are inexperienced with elections.  They 
find that once these countries are removed from the larger sample, the political fiscal 
cycle disappears.  
 
The procyclicality of monetary policy 
Countercyclical monetary policy is difficult to achieve, particularly because of lags 
and uncertainty.  For this reason, it is often suggested that the advantages of discretion in 
monetary policy are not large enough to outweigh disadvantages, such as the inflation 
bias from dynamic inconsistency, especially for developing countries.   Hence the support 
for the tying of hands and committing to a nominal target. 
Taking as given, however, some degree of commitment to a nominal target, it would 
seem to be self-defeating to choose a nominal target that could build unnecessary 
procyclicality into the automatic monetary mechanism.  But this is what inflation 
targeting does in the case of supply shocks.  Again, where terms of trade fluctuations are 
important, it would be better to choose a nominal anchor that accommodates terms of 
trade shocks rather than exacerbating them. 
 
                                                 
89 Gavin and Perotti(1997), Lane and Tornell (1999), Tornell and Lane (1999), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and 
Vegh (2004), Talvi and Végh  (2005), Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008), and Mendoza and Oviedo 
(2006). 
90 Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 8) use data from 60 democracies over the period 1960-1998.   Shi 
and Svensson (2006) use data from 91 countries over the period 1975–1995 Also Schuknecht (1996).   
Drazen (2001) offers an overview.    
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6.3 Commodities and the Dutch Disease 
 
Clear examples of countries with very high export price volatility are those 
specialized in the production of oil, copper, or coffee, which periodically experience 
swings in world market conditions that double or halve their prices.    
The Dutch Disease refers to some possibly unpleasant side effects of a boom in 
peteroleum or other mineral and agricultural commodities.
92  It arises when a strong, but 
perhaps temporary, upward swing in the world price of the export commodity causes the 
following pattern: a large real appreciation in the currency, an increase in spending (in 
particular, the government increases spending in response to the increased availability of 
tax receipts or royalties
93), an increase in the price of nontraded goods relative to non-
export-commodity traded goods, a resultant shift of resources out of non-export-
commodity traded goods, and a current account deficit .    When the adversely affected 
tradable goods are in the manufacturing sector, the feared effect is deindustrialization.   In 
a real model, the reallocation of resources across tradable sectors may be the inevitable 
consequence of a global increase in the real commodity price.  But the movement into 
non-traded goods is macroeconomic.  That it is all painfully reversed when the world 
price of the export commodity goes back down is what makes this a disease, particularly 
if the complete cycle is not adequately foreseen.    
Other examples of the Dutch Disease arise from commodity booms due to the 
discovery of new deposits or some other expansion in supply, leading to a trade surplus 
via exports or a capital account surplus via inward investment to develop the new 
resource.   In addition, the term is also used by analogy for other sorts of inflows such as 
the receipt of transfers (foreign aid or remittances) or a stabilization-induced capital 
inflow.    In all cases, the result is real appreciation and a shift into nontradables, and 
away from (non-commodity) tradables.    The real appreciation takes the form of a 
nominal appreciation if the exchange rate is flexible, and inflation if the exchange rate is 
fixed. 
A wide variety of policy measures have been proposed, and some adopted, to cope 
with the commodity cycle.
94   Some of the most important are institutions to insure that 
export earnings are put aside during the boom time, into a commodity saving fund, 
perhaps with the aid of rules governing the cyclically adjusted budget surplus.
95  Other 
proposals include using futures markets to hedge the price of the commodity and 
indexing debt to the price.   
 
   
6.4. Product-oriented choices for price index by inflation-targeters 
 
  Of the possible price indices that a central bank could target, the CPI is the usual 
choice.   The CPI is indeed the logical candidate to be the measure of the inflation 
objective for the long-term. But it may not be the best choice for intermediate target on 
                                                 
92 E.g., Corden (1984).  Frankel (2010) is a survey of the Dutch Disease and the more general Natural 
Resource Curse. 
93 E.g., Lane and Tornell (1998). 
94 E.g., Sachs (2007). 
95 Davis et al (2001).  Chile’s rule adjusts the budget surplus for the deviation of the copper price from its 
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an annual basis.  We have already noted that IT is not designed to be robust with respect 
to supply shocks.  If the supply shocks are terms of trade shocks, then the choice of CPI 
to be the price index on which IT focuses is particularly inappropriate.  
  Proponents of inflation targeting may not have considered the implications of the 
choice between the CPI and production-oriented price indices in light of terms of trade 
shocks.   One reason may be that the difference is not, in fact, as important for large 
industrialized countries as for small developing countries, especially those that export 
mineral and agricultural commodities.      
A CPI target, if implemented literally, can be destabilizing for a country subject to 
terms of trade volatility.  It calls for monetary tightening and currency appreciation when 
the price of the imported good goes up on world markets, but not when the price of the 
export commodity goes up on world markets – precisely the opposite of the desired 
pattern of response to terms of trade movements.  The alternative to the choice of CPI as 
price target is an output-based price index such as the PPI, the GDP deflator, or an index 
of export prices.   The important difference is that imported goods show up in the CPI, 
but not in the output-based price indices; and vice versa for exported goods: they show up 
in the output-based prices but much less in the CPI.    
  Terms of trade shocks for small countries can take two forms:  a fluctuation in the 
nominal price (i.e., dollar price) of export goods on world markets and a fluctuation in the 
nominal price of import goods on world markets.   Consider each in turn. 
 
Export price shocks 
  A traditional textbook advantage of floating exchange rates applies to commodity 
exporters in particular.   When world demand for the export commodity falls, the 
currency tends to depreciate, thus ameliorating the adverse effect on the current account 
balance and output.     When world demand for the export commodity rises, the currency 
tends to appreciate, thus ameliorating the inflationary impact.    One possible 
interpretation of the emerging market crises of the 1990s is that declines in world market 
conditions for oil and consumer electronics, exacerbated by a procyclical falloff in capital 
flows into emerging market countries that exported these products, eventually forced the 
abandonment of exchange rate targets.   The same devaluations could have been achieved 
much less painfully if they had come automatically, in tandem with the decline in 
commodity export prices.     
  It is evident that a fixed exchange rate necessarily requires giving up the 
automatic accommodation of terms of trade shocks.    A CPI target requires giving up 
accommodation of trade shocks as well;  but needlessly so.   A form of inflation targeting 
that focused on an export price index or product price index would experience an 
automatic appreciation in response to an increase in the world price of the export 
commodity:  in the absence of such an appreciation, the price index would rise, requiring 
the monetary authorities to tighten.    Thus the succinct argument for targeting a product-
oriented index is that it offers the best of both worlds:   the automatic accommodation of 
terms of trade shocks that floating promises, as well as the nominal anchor that an 
exchange rate target or inflation target promise.   
 
Do inflation targeters react perversely to import price shocks?   29
For countries that import oil rather than export it, a major source of terms of trade 
fluctuations takes the form of variation in world oil prices.  As Part 4 noted, there is a 
danger that CPI targeting, if interpreted too literally by central bankers, would force them 
to respond to an increase in the dollar price of their import goods by contracting their 
money supply enough to appreciate their currencies proportionately. 
 
Given the value that most central bankers place on transparency and their 
reputations, it would be surprising if their public emphasis on the CPI did not lead them 
to be at least a bit more contractionary in response to adverse supply shocks, and 
expansionary in response to favorable supply shocks, than they would be otherwise.  In 
other words, it would be surprising if they felt able to take full advantage of the escape 
clause offered by the idea of core CPI.   There is some reason to think that this is indeed 
the case.    A simple statistic:  the exchange rates of inflation-targeting countries (in 
dollars per national currency) are positively correlated with the dollar price on world 
markets of their import baskets.  Why is this fact revealing?   The currency should not 
respond to an increase in world prices of its imports by appreciating, to the extent that 
these central banks target core CPI (and to the extent that the commodities excluded by 
core CPI include all imported commodities that experience world price shocks, which is a 
big qualifier).  If anything, floating currencies should depreciate in response to such an 
adverse terms of trade shock.   When these IT currencies respond by appreciating instead, 
it suggests that the central bank is tightening monetary policy to reduce upward pressure 
on the CPI.   
Every one of the inflation targeters in Latin America shows a  monthly correlation 
between dollar prices of imported oil and the dollar values of their currencies that is both 
positive over the period 2000-2008 and greater than the correlation during the pre-IT 
period.
96  The evidence supports the idea that inflation targeters – in particular, Brazil, 
Chile and Peru -- tend to react to the positive oil shocks of the past decade by tightening 
monetary policy and thereby appreciating their currencies.    The implication seems to be 
that the CPI which they target does not in practice entirely exclude oil price shocks.   
 
What is wanted as candidate for nominal target is a variable that is simpler for the 
public to understand ex ante than core CPI, and yet that is robust with respect to supply 
shocks.   Being robust with respect to supply shocks means that the central bank should 
not have to choose ex post between two unpalatable alternatives:  an unnecessary 
economy-damaging recession or an embarrassing credibility-damaging violation of the 
declared target.    
 
PEP and PP targeting 
The idea of producer price targeting (PPT) is a moderate version of a more exotic 
proposed monetary regime called Peg the Export Price – or PEP, for short.  Under the 
PEP proposal, a copper producer would peg it currency to copper, an oil producer would 
peg to oil, a coffee producer to coffee, etc.
97       
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How would PEP work operationally?     Conceptually, one can imagine the 
government holding reserves of gold or copper or oil, and buying and selling the 
commodity whenever necessary to keep the price fixed in terms of local currency.    
Operationally, a more practical method would be for the central bank each day to 
announce an exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar, following the rule that the day’s exchange 
rate target (dollars per local currency unit) moves precisely in proportion to the day’s 
price of gold or copper or oil on the New York market (dollars per commodity).   Then 
the central bank could intervene via the foreign exchange market to achieve the day’s 
target.   The dollar would be the vehicle currency for intervention -- precisely as it has 
long been when a small country defends a peg to some non-dollar currency.   Either way, 
the effect would be to stabilize the price of the commodity in terms of local currency.  Or 
perhaps, since these commodity prices are determined on world markets, a better way to 
express the same policy is stabilizing the price of local currency in terms of the 
commodity. 
 
The argument for the export targeting proposal, relative to an exchange rate 
target, can be stated succinctly:    It delivers one of the main advantages that a simple 
exchange rate peg promises, namely a nominal anchor, while simultaneously delivering 
one of the main advantages that a floating regime promises, namely automatic adjustment 
in the face of fluctuations in the prices of the countries’ exports on world markets. 
Textbook theory says that when there is an adverse movement in the terms of trade, it is 
desirable to accommodate it via a depreciation of the currency.  When the dollar price of 
exports rises, under PEP the currency per force appreciates in terms of dollars.   When the 
dollar price of exports falls, the currency depreciates in terms of dollars.   Such 
accommodation of terms of trade shocks is precisely what is wanted.    In past currency 
crises, countries that have suffered a sharp deterioration in their export markets have 
often eventually been forced to give up their exchange rate targets and devalue anyway.  
The adjustment was far more painful -- in terms of lost reserves, lost credibility, and lost 
output -- than if the depreciation had happened automatically. 
  The desirability of accommodating terms of trade shocks is also a particularly 
good way to summarize the attractiveness of export price targeting relative to the 
reigning champion, CPI targeting.   Consider again the two categories of adverse terms of 
trade shocks: a fall in the dollar price of the export in world markets and a rise in the 
dollar price of the import on world markets.   In the first case, a fall in the export price, 
one wants the local currency to depreciate against the dollar.   As already noted, PEP 
delivers that result automatically; CPI targeting does not.    In the second case, a rise in 
the import price, the terms-of-trade criterion suggests that one again might want the local 
currency to depreciate.  Neither regime delivers that result.
98   But CPI targeting actually 
has the implication that the central bank tighten monetary policy so as to appreciate the 
currency against the dollar, by enough to prevent the local-currency price of imports from 
rising.     This implication – reacting to an adverse terms of trade shock by appreciating 
the currency – is perverse.   It can be expected to exacerbate swings in the trade balance 
and output.     
                                                 
98 There is a reason for that.  In addition to the goal of accommodating terms of trade shocks, there is also 
the goal of resisting inflation; but to depreciate in the face of an increase in import prices would exacerbate 
price instability.     31
 
Product Price Index 
A way to render the proposal far more moderate is to target a broad index of all 
domestically produced goods, whether exportable or not.  An index of product prices is 
superior to the GDP deflator in that – just like the CPI – it can easily be collected 
monthly.     Even in a poor small country with very limited capacity to gather statistics, 
government workers can survey a sample of firms every month to construct a primitive 
index of product prices as easily as they can survey a sample of retail outlets to construct 
a primitive CPI.     
 
If a broad index of export or product prices were to be the nominal target, it 
would of course in practice be impossible for the central bank to hit the target exactly, in 
contrast to the way that is possible to hit virtually exactly a target for the exchange rate, 
the price of gold, or even the price of a basket of four or five exchange-traded agricultural 
or mineral commodities.  There would instead be a declared band for the export price 
target, which could be wide if desired, just as with the targeting of the CPI, money 
supply, or other nominal variables.   Open market operations to keep the index inside the 
band if it threatens to stray outside could be conducted in terms either of foreign 
exchange or in terms of domestic securities.    
 
 
 
7.  Capital flows 
 
 7.1 The opening of emerging markets 
 
The first major post-war wave of private capital flows to developing countries 
came after the large oil price increases of the 1970s.   The major borrowers were 
governments in oil-importing countries, and the major vehicles were syndicated bank 
loans, often “recycling petrodollars” from surplus OPEC countries, via the London 
euromarket.     This first episode ended with the international debt crisis that surfaced in 
1982.  The second major wave began around 1989, and ended with the East Asia crisis of 
1997.   It featured a greater role for securities rather than bank loans, especially in East 
Asia, and the capital went relatively more to private sector borrowers.   The third wave 
began around 2003, this time including China and India, and may have ended with the 
global financial crisis of 2008.    
The boom-bust cycle, however, masks a long-run trend of gradually increased 
opening of financial markets.  We begin this part of the chapter by documenting the 
extent to which emerging market countries have indeed emerged, that is, the extent to 
which they have opened up to the international financial system.   We then consider the 
advantages and disadvantages of this financial integration 
 
7.2 Measures of financial integration 
 
Integration into international financial markets, much as integration into goods 
markets, can be quantified in three ways:   direct observation of the barriers to   32
integration, measurements based on flow quantities, and measurements based on the 
inferred ability of arbitrage to equalize returns across countries. 
 
Legal barriers to integration   
Most developing countries had serious capital controls as recently as the 1980s, 
but a majority liberalized them subsequently, at least on paper.   Many researchers use the 
binary accounting of de jure regulations maintained by the IMF, or the higher-resolution 
version of Quinn (1997).   These measures suggest substantial liberalization, especially in 
the 1990s.    The drawback is that de jure regulations may not reflect the reality.  Some 
governments do not enforce their capital controls (lack of enforcement can arise because 
the private sector finds ways around the controls, such as leads and lags in payments for 
imports and exports), while others announce a liberalization and yet continue to exercise 
heavy-handed “administrative guidance.”   
 
Quantities (gross or net) of capital flows.     
Many researchers prefer to use measures relating to capital flow quantities, 
because they reflect de facto realities.   There are many possible quantity-based measures.    
They include current account magnitudes, net capital flows, gross capital flows, 
debt/GDP ratios, and the “saving-retention coefficient” in a regression of national 
investment rates against national saving rates.
99   They also include risk-pooling estimates 
such as a comparison of cross-country consumption correlations with cross-country 
income correlations.   Tests find that the volatility of consumption in developing 
countries has, if anything, gone up rather than going down as one would expect if free 
capital flows smoothed interemporily.
100    
One disadvantage of trying to infer the degree of capital mobility from capital 
flow quantities is that they reflect not only the desired parameter but the magnitude of 
exogenous disturbances.   A country with genuine capital controls may experience large 
capital outflows in a year of exogenously low investment while a country with open 
markets may experience no net outflows in a year when national investment happens to 
equal approximately national saving.   Finance experts thus often prefer to look at prices 
rather than quantities. 
 
Arbitrage of financial market prices.     
If prices of assets or rates of return in one country are observed to fluctuate in 
close synchronization along with prices or returns in other countries, it is good evidence 
that barriers are low and arbitrage is operating freely. 
Sometimes one can test whether the price of an asset inside an emerging market is 
close to the price of essentially the same asset in New York or London.   One example is 
                                                 
99 Examples of this “Feldstein-Horioka regression” applied to developing countries include Dooley, Frankel 
and Mathieson (1987) and Holmes (2005).    Even when instrumenting for the endogeneity of national 
savings, the coefficient remains surprisingly high for developing countries, which throws additional doubt 
on whether this is actually a measure of barriers to capital mobility.  There is evidence that increases in the 
budget deficit are associated with decreases in national saving (both in developing countries and others -- 
Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano, 2000) some theories notwithstanding.  
100 Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and Kose (2003) and Levchenko (2004).  Such tests are better interpreted as 
throwing doubt on the proposition that capital flows work to smooth consumption than as tests of the 
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multiple listings of the same equity on different exchanges (e.g., Telmex).   A second is 
prices of American Depository Receipts or Global Depository Receipts.   A third is the 
price of a country fund traded in New York or London compared to the Net Asset Value 
of the same basket of equities in the home country.
101 
The more common kind of arbitrage tests are of interest rate parity, which 
compare interest rates on bonds domestically and abroad.   Of course bonds at home and 
abroad are often denominated in different currencies.    There are three versions of 
interest rate parity, quite different in their implications:   Closed or covered interest 
parity, open or uncovered interest parity, and real interest parity.      
 
Covered interest differentials are a useful measure of whether capital controls are 
effective;  they remove the currency element by hedging it on the forward market.    A 
growing number of emerging markets issue bonds denominated in their own currencies 
and offer forward rates, but many do not, and in most cases the data do not go back very 
far.   A more common way of removing the currency element is to look at the sovereign 
spread:  the premium that the country must pay to borrow in dollars, relative to LIBOR 
or the US Treasury bill rate.   The sovereign spread largely reflects default risk, and 
remains substantial for most developing countries.
102    An alternative is the Credit 
Default Swap, which became increasingly available for the larger emerging markets after 
1997 and again shows substantial default risk.
103   There are some indications that such 
measures may have underestimated risk during the boom phase of the credit cycle, 
relative to fundamentals, even ex ante.
104 
 
Equalization of expected returns across countries is implied by perfect financial 
integration,   if risk is unimportant – a very strong assumption.    Uncovered interest 
parity is the condition that the interest differential equals expected depreciation (which is 
stronger than covered interest parity, the arbitrage condition that the interest differential 
equals the forward discount, because the existence of an exchange risk premium would 
preclude it).     Another way of testing if expected returns are equalized across countries, 
is to see if the forward discount equals expected depreciation.  Often expected returns are 
inferred from the systematic component of ex post movements in the exchange rate.   The 
rejection of the null hypothesis is consistent and strong (though not as strong for 
emerging markets as in advanced countries).  In financial markets, exploitation of this 
forward rate bias is very popular, and goes by the name of the “carry trade”:   investors 
go short in the low-interest-rate currency and long in the high-interest-rate currency.   
Although there is always a risk that the currency will move against them, particular in an 
“unwinding” of the carry trade, on average they are able to pocket a profit.
105 
                                                 
101 Asymmetric information can characterize segmented markets.   There is some evidence that domestic 
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Expected returns in equity markets are another way of approaching the 
quantification of financial integration.   The literature is surveyed by Bekaert and Harvey 
(2003).  Liberalization of emerging markets shows up as increased correlation between 
returns locally and globally.
106  Meanwhile, that increased correlation reduces one of the 
major benefits of investing in emerging markets in the first place: portfolio 
diversification.
107 
 
Real interest rate equalization is the third of the parity conditions.  The 
proposition that real interest rates are equalized across countries is stronger than 
uncovered interest parity.
108   The proposition that real returns to equity are equalized is 
stronger still, as bonds and equity may not be fully integrated even within one country.
109  
Since sovereign spreads and covered interest differentials are often substantial for 
developing countries – and these would be pure arbitrage conditions, in the absence of 
capital controls and transactions costs -- it is not surprising that the stronger parity 
conditions fail as well.     
 
Sterilization and offset    
Given the progressively higher degree of capital mobility among developing 
countries, particularly among those known as emerging markets, models that previously 
would only have been applied to industrialized countries are now applied to them as well.   
This begins with the traditional textbook Mundell-Fleming model, designed to show how 
monetary and fiscal policy work under conditions of high capital mobility.    Monetary 
economists – usually with advanced countries in mind -- argue today that models can 
dispense with the LM curve, and the money supply itself, on the grounds that money 
demand is unstable and central banks have gone back to using the interest rate as their 
instrument anyway.
110   These concepts are still often necessary, however, for thinking 
about emerging markets, because they are necessary for thinking about the question of 
sterilization and offset. 
An application of interest is the principle of the Impossible Trinity:  are exchange 
rate stability, open financial markets, and monetary independence mutually 
incompatible?    Research does seem to bear out that countries with flexible exchange 
rates have more monetary independence.
111 
The literature on sterilization and offset is one way to parameterize whether 
capital mobility is so high that it has become difficult or impossible for a country with a 
fixed exchange rate to pursue a monetary policy independent of the rest of the world.   
The parameter of interest is the offset coefficient, defined as the fraction of an increase in 
net domestic assets (and thereby in the monetary base) that has leaked out of the country 
through a deficit in the capital account (and thereby in the overall balance of payments) 
after a given period of time.   The offset coefficient could be considered another entry on 
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the list of criteria in the preceding section for evaluating the degree of capital mobility.  It 
is the aspect of capital mobility that is of greatest direct interest for the conduct of 
monetary policy.    
Econometrically, any sort of attempt to estimate the offset coefficient by 
regressing the capital account or the overall balance of payments against net domestic 
assets is plagued by reverse causation.   If the central bank tries to sterilize reserve flows 
– and the point of the exercise is to see if it has the ability to do so – then there is a 
second equation in which changes in net domestic assets depend on the balance of 
payments.   Sorting out the offset coefficient from the sterilization coefficient is 
difficult.
112   Early attempts to do so suggested that central banks such as Mexico’s lose 
less than half of an expansion in domestic credit to offsetting reserve outflows within one 
quarter, but more in the long run.
113   This is consistent with Mexico’s attempt to sterilize 
reserve outflows in 1994, which seemed to work for almost a year, but then ended in the 
peso crisis.    
Perhaps it is easier to sterilize reserve inflows than outflows:   a number of emerging 
market central banks in the early 1990s succeeded in doing so for a year or two, by 
selling sterilization bonds to domestic residents.
114   But they found this progressively 
more difficult over time.  Keeping the domestic interest rate above the world interest rate 
created a quasi-fiscal deficit for the central bank.
115  Eventually they gave up, and 
allowed the reserve inflow to expand the money supply.  China during the period after 
2004 experienced the largest accumulation of reserves in history.
116  Although a highly 
regulated banking sector has efficiency costs, it does have advantages such as facilitating 
the sterilization of reserve flows.   For several years China succeeded in sterilizing the 
inflow.
117  Eventually, in 2007-08, China too had to allow the money to come in, 
contributing to overheating of the economy. 
 
Capital controls 
Most developing countries retained capital controls even after advanced countries 
removed theirs, and many still do.
118    Although there are many ways to circumvent 
controls,
119  it would be a mistake to think that they have little or no effect. 
There are many different varieties of capital controls.   An obvious first 
distinction is between controls that are designed to keep out inflows and those that work 
to block outflows.    
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Controls on inflows
120 are somewhat more likely to be enforceable.  It is easier to 
discourage foreign investors than to block up all the possible channels of escape.  
Furthermore controls on outflows tend to discourage inflows and so can fail on net.
121   
Chile famously deployed penalties on short-term capital inflows in the 1990s, 
which succeeded in shifting the maturity composition of inflows, considered more stable, 
without evidently reducing the total.
122   They do come with disadvantages,
123 and Chile 
removed its controls subsequently.  After the global financial crisis of 2008-09, Brazil 
revived the policy. 
 
Controls on capital outflows receive less support from scholars, but are still 
sometimes used by developing countries, especially under crisis conditions.   When 
Malaysia imposed controls on outflows in 1998 so as to be able to maintain its exchange 
rate, the result was not the disaster of which many economists had warned.
124  Magud and 
Reinhart (2007) find that capital controls in other countries have been less successful at 
reducing the volume of flows. 
 
 
7.2 Does financial openness improve welfare? 
 
A large literature is re-evaluating whether financial integration is beneficial, for 
developing countries in particular.   For a country deciding whether to open up to 
international capital flows, the question is whether advantages of financial integration 
outweigh the disadvantages.  Important surveys and overviews include Fischer (1997), 
Obstfeld (1998, 2009), Edison, Klein, Ricci, and Sloek (2004); Henry (2007), Kose, 
Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2009), Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003, 2010) and Rodrik 
(1998).
125  
 
Benefits to financial integration, in theory 
In theory, financial liberalization should carry lots of benefits. Potential gains 
from international trade in financial assets are analogous to the gains from international 
trade in goods.   First, it enables rapidly-developing countries to finance their investment 
more cheaply by borrowing from abroad than if they were limited to domestic savings.   
Second, it allows consumption smoothing in response to adverse shocks.  Third, it allows 
diversification of assets and liabilities across countries.   Fourth: it facilitates emulation of 
foreign banks and institutions. Fifth: it promotes discipline on macro policy.         
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Increasing doubts, in practice 
Financial markets do not work quite as smoothly in practice as some of the 
textbook theories suggest.   Three salient anomalies:   capital often flows “uphill” rather 
than from rich to poor, capital flows are often procyclical rather than counter cyclical, 
and severe debt crises don’t seem to fit the model. 
 
Capital flows uphill.    Countries that have lower income usually have lower 
capital/labor ratios.  In a neoclassical model,  with uniform production technologies, it 
would follow that they have higher returns to capital and, absent barriers to capital 
mobility, should on average experience capital inflows.   But capital seems to flow from 
poor to rich as often as the reverse, as famously pointed out by Lucas (1990).
126  
 
Procyclicality.    As already noted, rather than smoothing short-term disturbances 
such as fluctuations on world markets for a country’s export commodities, private capital 
flows are often procyclical:   pouring in during boom times and disappearing in 
recessions.  
 
Debt crises.    Financial liberalization has often been implicated in the crises 
experienced by emerging markets over the last ten years. Certainly a country that does 
not borrow from abroad in the first place cannot have an international debt crisis.  
Beyond that, there are concerns that (a) international investors have sometimes lost 
enthusiasm for emerging markets abruptly, unexplained by any identifiable change in 
fundamentals or information at hand, (b) that contagion sometimes carries the crises to 
countries with strong fundamentals, and (c) that the resulting costs, in terms of lost 
output, often seem disproportionate to any sins committed by policymakers.
127 The 
severity of the 2008-09 crisis inevitably raised once again the question of whether 
modern liberalized financial markets are more of a curse than a blessing.
128 Sometimes 
the doubts are phrased as a challenge to the “Washington consensus” in favor of free 
markets generally.
129 
 
Tests of overall benefits 
Some empirical studies have found evidence that these benefits are genuine.
130    
Some, more specifically, have found that opening up equity markets facilitates the 
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financing of investment.
131   Others have less sanguine results.
132  The theoretical 
prediction that financial markets should allow efficient risk-sharing and consumption-
smoothing is not borne out in many empirical studies.
133   
 
Conditions under which capital inflows are likely beneficial 
A blanket indictment (or vindication) of international capital flows would be too 
simplistic. Quite a lot of research argues that financial liberalization is more likely to be 
beneficial under some particular circumstances, and less so under others.   A recurrent 
theme is that the aggregate size of capital inflows is not as important as the conditions 
under which they take place.      
Some recent papers suggest that financial liberalization is good for economic 
performance if countries have reached a certain level of development, particularly with 
respect to institutions and the rule of law.
134   One specific claim is that financial opening 
lowers volatility
135  and raises growth
136  only for rich countries, and is more likely to 
lead to market crashes in lower-income countries.
137  A second claim is that capital 
account liberalization raises growth only in the absence of macroeconomic imbalances, 
such as overly expansionary monetary and fiscal policy.
138  A third important finding is 
that institutions (such as shareholder protection and accounting standards) determine 
whether liberalization leads to development of the financial sector,
139  and in turn to long-
run growth.
140    The cost-benefit trade-off from financial openness improves 
significantly once some clearly identified thresholds in  financial depth and institutional 
quality  are satisfied.
141  A related finding is that corruption tilts the composition of 
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capital inflows toward the form of banking flows (and away from FDI), and toward 
dollar-denomination (vs. denomination in domestic currency), both of which have been 
associated with crises.
142     Inadequacies in the financial structures of developing 
countries probably explain the findings that financial opening in those countries does not 
produce faster long-run growth as it does in industrial countries.  The implication is that 
financial liberalization can help if institutions are strong and other fundamentals are 
favorable, but can hurt if they are not.
143   
All of these findings are consistent with the longstanding conventional lesson 
about the sequencing of reforms:  that countries will do better in the development process 
if they postpone opening the capital account until after other institutional reforms.  The 
reasoning is that it is dangerous for capital flows to be allowed to respond to faulty 
signals.
144  The observable positive correlation between the opening of capital markets 
and economic growth could be attributable to reverse causation — that rich countries 
liberalize as a result of having developed, not because of it. Edison, et al, (2002), 
however, conclude from their own tests that this is not the case.     
 
7.3 Capital inflow bonanzas 
  
With each episode of strong capital inflows to emerging markets, everyone would 
like to believe that the flows originate in good domestic fundamentals, such as 
macroeconomic stabilization and microeconomic reforms.  Some research, however, 
indicates that external factors are at least as influential as domestic fundamentals.  Low 
US interest rates are often identified as a major influence.
145   This research is important 
because during booms the authors are often among the few offering the warning that if 
inflows result from easy US monetary policy more than in domestic fundamentals, 
outflows are likely to follow in the next phase of the cycle.    Even preceding the 2008 
global financial crisis, much of the research on the carry trade implied that capital flows 
from low interest rate countries (the United States, Japan and Switzerland) to high 
interest rate countries (Iceland, New Zealand and Hungary) could rapidly unwind.  
Earlier, Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993, 1994ab, 1996) were prescient with respect 
to the 1994 Mexican Peso crisis. 
146   Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) again find that global 
factors, such as U.S. interest rates, have been a driver of the global capital flow cycle 
since 1960.   These papers also shed important light on how emerging market authorities 
manage the inflows, as between currency appreciation, sterilized foreign exchange 
intervention, unsterilized intervention, and capital controls. 
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8  Crises in Emerging Markets 
 
The boom phase is often followed by a bust phase.
147  We begin with an enumeration 
and definition of the various concepts of external crises in the literature.    
 
8.1 Definitions: Reversals, stops, attacks, and crises  
 
Current account reversals are defined as a reduction within one year of the current 
account deficit of a certain percentage of GDP.   Typically a substantial current account 
deficit disappears, and is even converted into a surplus.
148   An observed switch from 
current account deficit to surplus could, however, be due to an export boom, which is 
quite different from the exigent circumstance that most have in mind.  More refined 
concepts are needed. 
“Sudden Stops” is an expression first used by Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdes 
(1995).   They are typically defined as a substantial unexpected reduction in net capital 
inflows. The first theoretical approach to the problem of sudden stops is Calvo (1998).  A 
large theoretical literature followed.
149     
Operationally, the Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004) criterion for sudden stop is a 
sudden cut in foreign capital inflows (a worsening of the financial account, at least two 
standard deviations below the sample mean) that is not the consequence of a positive 
shock (namely a trade shock), but rather is accompanied by a costly reduction in 
economic activity.
150   Another way to restrict the episodes to reductions in deficits that 
cannot result from a boom – rising exports and income— is to add the criterion that they 
are accompanied by an abrupt reduction in international reserves.    
An important variety of sudden stops is called “systemic,” that is, threatening the 
international financial system, not just a single country.
151  In order to isolate episodes of 
capital account reversals related to systemic events of an external origin, they define 
crises as periods of collapsing net capital inflows that are accompanied with skyrocketing 
Emerging Markets bond spreads. 
“Speculative attacks” are defined as a discrete increase in demand for foreign 
currency, in exchange for domestic currency, by speculators (i.e., market participants 
betting on a devaluation).    The precise date of the speculative attack may come later 
than the sudden stop, for example if the central bank is able to prolong the status quo 
after the loss of capital inflows, by running down reserves for a period of time.   In 
typical models, the speculative attack is successful, in the sense that the central bank runs 
out of reserves on that same day, and is forced to devalue in the way the speculators 
anticipated.  But there is also a notion that there can be unsuccessful speculative attacks, 
in which the authorities fight the speculation, for example by raising interest rates sharply 
                                                 
147 Overviews of crises in emerging markets that ended the 1990s boom include Fischer (2004), Kenen 
(2001) and Desai (2003). 
148 Edwards (2004a, b) and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998, 2000). 
149 References include, among many others, Arellano and Mendoza (2003),  Calvo (2003), Calvo, Izquierdo 
and Talvi (2003, 2006), Calvo and Reinhart (2001), Guidotti, Sturzenegger and Villar (2004), and Mendoza 
(2002, 2006). 
150 Also Edwards (2004b). 
151 Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (2006).   41
or paying out reserves, and ultimately are able to maintain the parity, versus successful 
speculative attacks, in which they are ultimately forced to devalue.
152   The latter is 
sometimes defined as a currency crash, if the devaluation is at least 25% and it exceeds 
the rate of depreciation in preceding years by at least 10%.
153 
 
Generations of models of speculative attacks 
The leading theoretical framework for currency crises is built around models of 
speculative attacks.    The literature is often organized into a succession of several 
generations.   In each case, the contribution made by the seminal papers was often the 
ability to say something precise about the date when the speculative attack occurred.   But 
the generations can be distinguished according to whether the fundamental problem is 
seen as, respectively: overly expansionary monetary policy, multiple equilibria, or 
structural problems associated with moral hazard and balance sheet effects. 
The first generation models began with Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber 
(1984).
154   The government was assumed to be set on an exogenous course of rapid 
money creation, perhaps driven by the need to finance a budget deficit.   A resulting 
balance of payments deficit implies that the central bank will eventually run out of 
reserves and need to devalue.   But under rational expectations, speculators will anticipate 
this, and will not wait so long to sell their domestic currency as to suffer capital loss.   
But neither will they attack the currency as early as the original emergence of the deficit.  
Rather, the speculative attack falls on the date when the reserves left in the vault of the 
central bank are just barely enough to cover the discontinuous fall in demand for 
domestic currency that will result from the shift from a situation of a steady exchange 
rate and prices to a new steady state of depreciation and inflation.      
The second generation of models of speculative attacks argue that more than one 
possible outcome – crisis and no-crisis – can be consistent with equilibrium, even if there 
has been no change in fundamentals.  In a self-fulfilling prophecy, each market 
participant sells the domestic currency if he or she thinks the others will sell.  The 
seminal papers are by Obstfeld (1986b, 1996).
155   One branch of the second generation 
models focuses on the endogeneity of monetary policy: the central bank may genuinely 
intend not to inflate, but may be forced into it when, for example, labor unions win higher 
wages.
156  Many of the models build on the theories of bank runs (Diamond and Dybvyg, 
1983)
157 and the prisoners’ dilemma (where speculators each try to figure out whether the 
                                                 
152 Guidotti, Sturzenegger and Villar (2004) distinguish between sudden stops that lead to current account 
reversals and those that don’t. In the latter case, presumably the country found an alternative source of 
financing, namely reserve depletion or exceptional funding from an international financial institution.  
153 E.g. Frankel and Rose (1996).   A “currency crisis” is defined as a sharp increase in exchange market 
pressure that shows up either as a 25% devaluation or as a loss of reserves that is a commensurate 
proportion of the monetary base. 
154 Obstfeld (1986a) did it in an optimizing model. 
155 Attacks occur deterministically if fundamentals such as reserves are weak, and do not occur if they are 
strong.  Multiple equilibria arise in a third case: intermediate levels of fundamentals.  Also Sachs, Tornell 
and Velasco (1996a). 
156 Obstfeld (1996) and Jeanne (1997).
   
157 Among the authors applying the bank runs theory to emerging market crises are Chang and Velasco 
(1997, 1999a, b, 2001).  The fundamental problem of bank illiquidity is exacerbated by financial   42
others are going to attack).
158  The balance sheet problems discussed earlier also often 
play a key role here.  Morris and Shin (1998) make the important modification of 
introducing uncertainty into the model, which can rule out multiple equilibria.      
Another important category of speculative attack models attributes crises neither to 
monetary fundamentals, as in the first generation, nor to multiple equilibria, as in the 
second generation.
159    The culprit, rather, is structural flaws in the financial system that 
create moral hazard in the behavior of domestic borrowers vis-à-vis their government.   
Certain domestic borrowers, whether banks or firms, have close connections with the 
government.   When the East Asia crisis hit in 1997, the problem came to be known 
popularly as “crony capitalism.”
160   The government in turn has access to a supply of 
foreign exchange, in the form of foreign exchange reserves, and perhaps also in the 
ability to tax export receipts or to borrow from the IMF.   Even in cases where the 
government says explicitly ahead of time that domestic borrowers will not be bailed out, 
those that are well connected believe (usually correctly) that they will be bailed out in the 
event of a crisis.  Thus they over-borrow.    The speculative attack comes on the day 
when the stock of international debt that has some claim on government rescue becomes 
as large as the supply of reserves.    (Again, rational speculators will not wait longer, 
because there would then not be enough foreign currency to go around.)    The ideas go 
back to Diaz-Alejandro (1985).   Dooley (2000a)’s “insurance model” can claim the 
honor of having been written just before the East Asia crisis.
161  Krugman (1998) is 
probably the most widely cited.
162 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
liberalization.  Under fixed exchange rates, a run on banks becomes a run on the currency if the Central 
Bank attempts to act as a lender of last resort. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) documented the frequency 
with which banking crises and currency crises come together.     Also Diamond and Rajan (2001), 
Hausmann and Rojas-Suárez (1996), and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2004).  Martinez Peria and 
Schmukler (2001) examined the role of deposit insurance.   Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000) found that 
foreign ownership of banks is not the problem.   Radelet and Sachs (1998) suggested that the East Asia 
crisis of 1997-98 was essentially an international version of a bank run. 
158  One variant of the game theory approach, motivated by concerns that a single large hedge fund could 
deliberately engineer a crisis, posits a player that is larger than the others:  Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini 
(2002); and Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004).  
159 The “two generations” language originated with Eichengreen.  Views vary as to what should be 
designated the third generation.   Krugman (1999) says that the third generation should be identified by  
balance sheet effects, not by banking bailouts per se.  But, to me, only bailout moral hazard considerations 
merit the designation of a third generation. 
160 Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) statistically study family-controlled firms in East Asia.   Rajan and 
Zingales (1998b) study relationship banking. 
161 Likewise McKinnon and Pill (1996). 
162 Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999a, b), Chinn, Dooley, and Shrestha (1999) and Chinn and Kletzer 
(2001) are among those attributing the East Asia crisis to structural flaws in the financial system of the 
moral hazard sort.   In the theories of Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001a,b, 2004), government 
guarantees to banks give them an incentive to incur foreign debt.   Calvo and Mendoza  (1996) see roots of 
Mexico's 1994 peso crisis in financial globalization, anticipation of a banking-system bailout, and self-
fulfilling prophecy.   43
Although it is often presumed that foreign residents, rather than domestic residents, lead 
the way in pulling money out of a country during a speculative attack, there is no 
presumption in theory that this is the case.  Nor does the empirical evidence seem to support 
it.
163 
 
8.2   Contagion 
  
It has long been noted that when one emerging market is hit by a sudden stop, it is 
more likely that others will be as well.    The correlation tends to be much greater within 
the same general geographic area.
164 
There is not complete agreement as to the definition of contagion.  Some correlation 
across emerging markets can be explained by common external shocks.
165   Masson 
(1999) calls these monsoonal effects.  They are best not termed contagion, as the phrase 
implies transmission from one country to another, which Masson calls spillover effects.   
Spillover effects that can be readily interpreted in terms of fundamentals include 
investment linkages, trade linkages, and competition in third markets.  A number of 
interesting specific channels of contagion from one country to another have been 
identified empirically.
166    Finally, there is what might be called pure contagion, which 
runs via investor behavior in a world of imperfectly efficient financial markets.  One 
example is information cascades: investors may react to a crisis in Thailand or Russia by 
revising their estimation of the value of the “Asian model” or the odds of IMF bailouts.
167   
Another example is illiquidity in international financial markets and reduced risk 
tolerance, which in crises such as 2008 seem to induce flight from emerging markets 
generally, alongside flight from high-yield corporate debt and any other assets suspected 
of illiquidity or risk. 
8.3 Managing Emerging Market Crises 
 
There have long been three legs to the policymaking stool of managing crises in 
developing countries:  adjustment of national policies, “Private Sector Involvement,” and 
                                                 
163 Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999, 2005) and Frankel and Schumkler (1996).  If anything, domestic investors 
have the informational advantage.   
164 Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996); Baig and Goldfajn (1999); Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2000); 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005), Forbes and Rigobon (2000, 2002), Rigobon (2000); Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000, 2002);  Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003), Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999); and 
Corsetti,Pericoli and Sbracia (2005). 
165 A prominent example of a common external shock is an increase in US interest rates, a factor discussed 
earlier.  Uribe and Yue (2003).       
166 Glick and Rose (1999), Forbes (2002) and Forbes and Chinn (2004) find that contagion moves along the 
lines of trade linkages.  Kaminsky and Reinhart (2008) find that when contagion spreads across continents, 
it passes through major financial centers along the way.   Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) find contagion 
via rating agencies.   Borensztein and Gelos (2003) find herding among emerging market mutual funds. 
 
167 This is not to say investors are irrational. Calvo and Mendoza (2000) demonstrate that globalization  
 “may promote rational contagion by weakening individual incentives for gathering costly information.”   
Morck , Yeung and Yu (2000) attribute the correlation among emerging markets to shared weak property 
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the role of the IMF and other multilateral participation. 
 
Adjustment  
In the traditional orthodoxy, a crisis required adjustment of the macroeconomic 
policies that had gotten the country into the problem in the first place.  In the old 
language of Harry Johnson, this meant some combination of expenditure-switching 
policies, in practice meaning devaluation, and expenditure reducing policies, meaning 
monetary and fiscal contraction – typically substantial doses of all of the above. 
A tightening of monetary policy is often the first response to a sudden stop.  The 
urgent need in a currency crisis is to improve the balance of payments.  Raising interest 
rates is thought to do this in two ways:  first by making domestic assets more attractive to 
international investors, and second by cutting domestic expenditure and therefore 
improving the trade balance.   
Many have analyzed the so-called interest rate defense, particularly the question 
whether and when it is preferable to devaluation.
168  Furman and Stiglitz  (1998) 
emphasize that an increase in the interest rate can decrease the attractiveness of the 
country’s assets to foreign investors, rather than increasing it, because of the increase in 
default risk.
169   But this point does not change the basic logic that some combination of 
monetary contraction and devaluation is called for, to restore external balance, absent 
some international angel willing and able to make up the gap in financing.  The 
possibility that devaluation is contractionary does, by contrast, interfere with the basic 
logic that the central bank can deploy the optimal combination of an increase in the 
interest rate and an increase in the exchange rate to restore external balance without 
losing internal balance.
170 
 
Private Sector Involvement 
If a crisis debtor is to compress spending and the IMF or other parts of the 
international financial community is to chip in with an emergency loan, the foreign 
exchange should not go merely to helping the countries creditors cash in and depart the 
scene.    Private Sector Involvement was the term for the requirement adopted in the 
1990s for “bailing in” private creditors rather than “bailing them out.”   The idea is that 
creditors agree to roll over loans as part of the complete package that includes the 
national government and the IMF, and that it is in their interest collectively to do so even 
if the free rider problem tempts each of them to get out.   This process was thought to 
have been easier in the 1980s, when the creditors were banks finite in number and 
susceptible to negotiation, and to have grown more difficult subsequently, when the 
creditors have more often constituted a larger number of widely-dispersed bondholders.   
But the basic issue is the same either way. 
 
The International Financial Institutions 
                                                 
168 Aghion, Banerjee and Bacchetta (2000); Flood and Rose (2002); Christiano, Gust, and Roldos (2002); 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001); Drazen (2003);  and Eichengreen and Rose (2003).    
169 Also Blanchard (2005).  This point is rooted in the theory of imperfect information and credit rationing 
– Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).   Lahiri and Vegh (2003, 2007) show that, under certain conditions, it is 
feasible to delay the crisis, but raising interest rates beyond a certain point may actually hasten the crisis.   
170 Frankel (2003).    45
The International Financial Institutions (the IMF, the World Bank, and other 
multilateral development banks) and governments of the United States and other large 
economies (usually in the form of the G-7, in the past) are heavily involved in 
“managing” financial crises.
171 
The IMF is not a full-fledged Lender of Last Resort, though some have proposed 
that it should be.
172  The Fund does not contribute enough money to play this role in 
crises, even in the high-profile rescue programs where the loans are a large multiple of 
the country’s quota.   Usually the IMF is viewed as applying a “Good housekeeping seal 
of approval,” where it vouches for the remedial actions to which the country has committed. 
 
IMF conditionality has been severely criticized.
173 There is a broad empirical 
literature on the effectiveness of conditional IMF lending.
174   The better studies have 
relied on large cross country samples that allow for the application of standard statistical 
techniques to test for program effectiveness, avoiding the difficulties associated with 
trying to generalize from the finding of a few case studies. The overall conclusion of such 
studies seems to be that IMF programs and IMF conditionality may have on balance a 
positive impact on key measures of economic performance.   Such assessments suggest 
that IMF programs result in improvements in the current account balance and the overall 
balance of payments.
175    
The impact of IMF programs on growth and inflation is less clear.  The first round 
of studies failed to find any improvement in these variables.  Subsequent studies suggest 
that IMF programs result in lower inflation.
176  The impact of IMF programs on growth is 
more ambiguous.  Results on short-run growth are mixed; some studies find that 
implementation of IMF programs leads to an immediate improvement in growth,
177 while 
other studies find a negative short-run effect.
178  Studies that look at a longer time 
horizon, however, tend to show a revival of growth.
179 This is to be expected: countries 
entering into IMF programs will often implement policy adjustments that have the 
immediate impact of reducing demand, but could ultimately create the basis for sustained 
growth.  The structural reforms embedded in IMF programs inherently take time to 
improve economic performance.  Finally, the crisis that led to the IMF program, not the 
IMF program itself, is often responsible for an immediate fall in growth. 
                                                 
171 Among many references: Cline (1985, 1994), Eichengreen and De Long (2002) and Frankel and 
Roubini (2003). 
172 Fischer (1999). 
173 E.g., Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and Radelet and Sachs (1998).   In the East Asia crises, the criticism 
focused not just on the austerity of macroeconomic conditionality, but also on the perceived ‘mission 
creep” of venturing into microeconomic reforms not conventionally associated with financial crises. 
174 Including Bird and Rowlands (1997), Faini, de Melo, Senhadji-Semlali and Stanton (1991), Joyce (1992), 
and Hutchison (2003). 
175 Haque and Khan (2002) provide a survey. 
176 Conway (1994), Bagci and Perrudin (1997) and Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni and Schadler (2000) found 
that inflation fell following an IMF program; the result was statistically significant only in the first two of 
these three studies.   
177 Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni and Schadler (2000). 
178 Bordo and Schwartz (2000) compare countries receiving IMF assistance during crises in the period 
1973-98 with countries in the same region not receiving assistance and find that the real performance (for 
example, GDP growth) of the former group was possibly worse than the latter. 
179 Conway (1994).   46
Despite such academic conclusions, there was a movement away from strict 
conditionality subsequent to the emerging market crises of the 1990s.  In part, the new 
view increasingly became that the Fund could not force a country to follow the 
macroeconomic policy conditions written into an agreement, if the deep political forces 
within the country would ultimately reject the policies.
180  It is necessary for the local 
government to “take ownership” of the reforms.
181   One proposal to deal with this 
situation was the Contingent Credit Line: a lending facility that would screen for the 
policy conditions ex ante, and then unconditionally insure the country against external 
financial turmoil ex post.  The facility was reborn under the name Flexible Credit Line in 
the 2008-09 financial crisis, with less onerous conditionality.  But most emerging market 
countries managed to avoid borrowing from the Fund this time, with the exception of 
some, particularly in Eastern Europe, that were in desperate condition. 
 
Some critics worry that lending programs by the International Financial 
Institutions and G-7 or other major governments create moral hazard, that debtor 
countries and their creditors have little incentive to take care because they know they will 
be rescued.   Some even claim that this international moral hazard is the main reason for 
crises, that the international financial system would operate fine if it weren’t for such 
meddling by public institutions.
182 
There is a simple way of demonstrating that moral hazard arising from 
international bailouts cannot be the primary market failure.   Under a neo-classical model, 
capital would flow from rich high capital/labor countries to lower-income low 
capital/labor country, for example from the United States to China.  Instead it often flows 
the opposite way, as already noted.   Even during the peaks of the lending booms, the 
inflows are less than would be predicted by an imperfection-free neoclassical model.
183   
Therefore any moral hazard incentive toward greater capital flows created by the IFIs 
must be less than the various market failures that inhibit capital flows.   
 
8.4    Policy Instruments and Goals After a Balance of Payments Shock 
     
  Why have so many countries suffered deep recessions as part of the adjustment 
process in the aftermath of a deterioration in their balance of payments?   One school of 
thought is that policy has been too contractionary, perhaps because the IMF does not 
understand that an increase in the interest rate increases default risk.
184  
  In this section we consider the problem of a central bank attempting to attain two 
goals -- internal and external balance – by means of two policy instruments – the 
exchange rate and the interest rate.
185     Our interpretation of internal balance is Y  =  Y ,   
                                                 
180 According to the influential strain of research represented by Acemoglu et al (2003), Easterly and 
Levine (2002) and Hall and Jones (1999), institutions drive out the effect of policies.   Evrensel  (2002) 
finds that the IMF is not able to enforce macroeconomic conditionality.    
181 Boughton (2003).   
182 Bordo and Schwartz (2000), Calomiris (1998),  Dooley and Verma (2003), and Meltzer (2000).  But 
Lane and Phillips (2001) find no evidence that country spreads react to changes in the moral hazard of 
international bailouts. 
183 E.g., Blanchard (1983). 
184 Furman and Stiglitz (1998), as discussed in the preceding sub-section. 
185 The graphical analysis is from Frankel (2003a) , but the algebra has been added.   47
where Y ≡ real income and    Y   ≡ potential output. 
Our interpretation of external balance is that overall balance of payments BP = 0, 
where  BP = CA + KA, 
CA ≡ current account, and 
KA ≡ capital account. 
One could just as easily choose different goals for the levels of Y and BP. 
 
  Internal and External Balance When Devaluation is Expansionary 
Assume for now:       Y = A(i) + TB , 
where  i ≡ domestic interest rate;  and 
absorption, A, is a function of the interest rate, with  0 <
di
dA
. 
Assume that the trade balance, linearized for simplicity,  is given by TB = xE - mY. 
where  
E ≡ the exchange rate, defined as the price of foreign currency. 
If the trade balance is derived from an elasticities approach (the country has some 
monopoly power in its export good, as in Section 2.2), then x is related to the sensitivity 
of export demand to relative prices;   if the trade balance is derived from the traded goods 
/ nontraded goods model (the country is a price-taker in all traded goods, as in the small 
open economy model of section 2.3), then x is related to sensitivity of the supply of 
traded goods to relative prices.     “Sensitivity” could simply mean, for example, the 
elasticity, normalized for the quantity of goods relative to E, if there were no additional 
effect on import spending or the demand for traded goods. 
 
  Assume that the capital account of the balance of payments is given by the 
function: 
KA = k(i-i*), where  0
*) (
>
− i i d
dk
, 
and i* ≡ world interest rate. 
 
First we derive the internal balance relationship, solving for Y as a function of i 
and E. 
 
Y   =   A ( i )   +   T B           (3) 
 
TB = xE – mY                            (4)    
Substitute (4) into (3):    Y = 
) 1 (
) (
m
xE i A
+
+
      (5) 
  We want the relationship between i and E that gives internal balance (output equal 
to potential:     Y Y =
__
   => 
   
__
Y  = 
) 1 ( ) 1 (
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m
xE
m
i A
+
+
+
   .      (6) 
An increase in E would improve the trade balance, resulting in a rise in Y as well.  In 
order to go back to the potential output, we need to increase the interest rate. Thus the 
graph looks like this, labeled NN:   48
 
 
  Figure 1: Slope of Internal Balance curve is conventionally positive. 
 
 
We obtain the slope of the NN curve by differentiating equation (6): 
 
   
Y Y i
E
= ∂
∂
  = x
Ai −       ( 7 )  
 
As  i A   < 0, the slope is positive, which is why we have drawn NN sloping upward.  
Intuititively, because a devaluation is expansionary, it would have to be offset by a 
contractionary increase in the interest rate if total output is to remain at the same level. 
 
Second we derive the external balance relationship,  solving for BP as a function 
of i and E.  The Balance of Payments is the sum of the trade balance and the capital 
account: 
 
    KA TB BP + =  
    *) ( i i k mY xE BP − + − =      (8) 
 
We plug equation (5) into equation (8) to eliminate Y, and rearrange to obtain the BP in 
terms of E and i.  External Balance is achieved when BP=0;  therefore 
 
  BP =  ) (
1
) (
1
i k
m
i mA
m
xE
+
+
−
+
 = 0             (9) 
 
We draw the relationship between i and E that gives external balance.     
If E increases then the interest rate has to fall in order to restore external balance. 
Therefore, the trade surplus created by the increase in E would be offset by the capital 
outflow and increase in imports.  In the graph we label the external balance line BB: 
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  Figure 2: Slope of External Balance curve is negative. 
 
 
To obtain the slope, we differentiate equation (9) to obtain:        
  
0 = ∂
∂
BP i
E
  i i k
x
m
A
x
m +
− =
1
              (10) 
 
As  i A <0  and  i k >0, the slope is negative, which is why we have drawn BB sloping 
downward.    Intuitively, a devaluation improves the trade balance, which could be 
financed by borrowing from abroad if the interest rate is raised. 
 
  The points below the BB curve are points of deficit.  The interest rate isn’t high 
enough to attract the necessary capital inflow.   Assume an exogenous adverse capital 
account shock, a rise in the world interest rate i* or some other  downward shift in KA, as 
in a speculative attack.  In other words, the country now finds itself in balance of 
payments deficit.    If the country has an adverse capital account shock, then BB curve 
shifts to the right (BB´) so the country finds that its location point now corresponds to a 
Balance of Payments deficit, because it is to the left of the new BB’ Schedule.  At E the 
objective is to reach E’ where the economy is at both at internal and external balance. In 
this case the policy options are clear: the central bank has to raise the interest rate and 
depreciate the currency. While the increase in the interest rate attracts capital inflows, it 
also causes a contraction in output. Fortunately, the country has another instrument, the 
exchange rate, at hand. Devaluation will improve exports, which in turn will pick up both 
the trade balance and the output.   The optimal combination of E and i will put the 
economy at the intersection of the two graphs, where the new external balance constraint 
is satisfied, without a recession.    This is harder in practice than in theory, due especially 
to uncertainty;   but policy-makers can grope their way to equilibrium through a 
tatonnement process.    
  Notice that the fundamental logic of the graph does not change even if default risk 
means that ki is very small.   Even if the capital account does not improve, an increase in 
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the interest rate still improves the balance of payments by reducing spending and 
therefore raising the trade balance. 
 
 
  Figure 3: “Sudden stop” shifts External Balance curve out. 
 
 
Internal and External Balance When Devaluation is Contractionary 
  Now assume that devaluation has a contractionary effect on domestic demand, for 
example because of a balance sheet effect from dollar debts, or any of the other reasons 
discussed in Section 2.4: 
Y = A(i, E) + TB      0 <
di
dA
,   0 <
dE
dA
 . 
 
We have the following solution for output:  Y = 
) 1 (
) , (
m
xE E i A
+
+
     (11) 
Set 
__
Y Y = and differentiate to obtain the new slope of NN,  
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We will assume that x the stimulus to net exports from a devaluation is small in the short 
run, because the elasticities are small, so that AE dominates, and the devaluation is indeed 
contractionary overall:   The slope is negative.    
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  Figure 4: Balance sheet effect turns Internal Balance slope negative. 
 
  We again illustrate the shift in the figure if there is an exogenous adverse balance 
of payments shock.   Now both internal and external balances have negative slopes.   
They may not intersect at all.   In this case, we are not confident in which direction the 
interest and the exchange rate should go. When the balance of payment goes into deficit 
due to a shock in the capital account (a point like D) a devaluation will restore the 
external balance (by improving the trade balance); but at the same time a devaluation 
hurts the economy as it is contractionary. Moreover, the improvement in exports may not 
be enough to offset the contractionary effects so the country may go into a recession.   
We have a situation where we may not be able restore equilibrium internally and 
externally, at least not at reasonable levels of E and i ;  and even if we can in theory, it is 
not possible to say whether E should be increased a lot and i decreased, or vice versa.   
Even assuming the two curves intersect somewhere, a process of tatonnement by policy-
makers may take a long time to get there, and the curves may have moved again by that 
time.  The lesson:  it is better in the first place not to develop balance sheets that are so 
vulnerable as to put policy-makers in such a difficult situation as illustrated in the figure. 
    
8.5.  Default and avoiding it 
 
  One option for a country in severe payments difficulty is simply to default on its 
debt.   Yet it has relatively been rare during the post-war period for countries to do so.   
The big question is “why?”   Two answers are most common. 
 
  Why don’t countries default? 
The first reason why countries are said not to default on their debt is that they 
don’t want to lose access to capital markets in the future.  International investors will 
want to punish defaulters by refusing to lend to them in the future, or perhaps by lending 
only at severe penalty interest rates.  But is that threat regarding the distant future enough 
to discourage countries from defaulting and thereby saving a great deal of foreign 
exchange today?   And, for their part, is the threat by international investors never to lend 
again credible in the sense that they will have the incentive to stick to it in the future?    
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Bulow and  Rogoff (1989) answer no: that threat won’t sustain non-default, in a repeated 
game. 
186 
The other common answer is that countries are afraid that if they default they will 
lose trade.  In one version, they are afraid of losing the trade credit, or even access to the 
international payments system:  even if they pay cash for an import, the cash might be 
seized by a creditor in payment of an outstanding debt.    The classic reference is Eaton 
and Gersovitz (1981).   Some persuasive empirical evidence appears to support this 
theory.
187   It is also consistent with evidence that countries possessing high overall 
trade/GDP ratios suffer from fewer sudden stops
188:  international investors will be less 
likely to pull out, because they know the country is less likely to default.  Under this 
logic, a higher ratio of trade is a form of “giving hostages” that makes a cut off of lending 
less likely. 
 
Another possible answer to the question, “why don’t countries default” is that 
they do, but not explicitly.   Countries often announce that they are unable to service their 
debts under the schedule or terms contractually agreed to.   A painful process usually 
follows in which they negotiate new terms. 
 
Ex ante measures for better risk-sharing 
The largest cost arising from protracted negotiations over restructuring is the 
disincentive to domestic investment and output created by the debt overhang in the 
meantime.  Domestic firms will not seek to earn foreign exchange if they think it will be 
taken away from them, to service past debts.
189  
Reformers wishing to reduce the severity of emerging market crises have asked 
whether there is not a way for lenders and borrowers to agree ahead of time on a more 
efficient way to share risk.    The goal of minimizing high costs to restructuring debt is the 
same as that which is thought to be achieved in the domestic context by bankruptcy 
law.
190   One proposed solution is to establish the equivalent of an international 
bankruptcy court, perhaps as a “debt workout” office of the IMF. 
191                    
Collective Action Clauses are one proposal that was eventually adopted in some 
prominent emerging markets.  The investors agree ex ante in the bond contract that in the 
event a restructuring should prove necessary, a few holdouts among the creditors will not 
be able to obstruct a settlement that the rest regard as beneficial.   CACs are sold as a 
                                                 
186 Dooley and Svensson (1994), however, argue that debtors are unable to suspend debt service 
permanently and credibly. 
187 Rose and Spiegel (2004) and Rose (2005) find that bilateral debt reschedulings lead to losses of trade 
along corresponding bilateral lines, estimated at 8 percent a year for 15 years, from which he infers that lost 
trade is the motivation debtors have to avoid such defaults.   Rose and Spiegel (2008) find that strong 
bilateral trade links are correlated with low default probabilities.    
188 Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004), Edwards (2004), and Cavallo and Frankel (2008). 
189 Krugman (1989) and Sachs (1983) argued that the efficiency burden of the debt overhang in the 1980s 
was sufficiently great that forgiveness would make all better off, creditors as well as debtors, a logic that 
contributed to the Brady Plan writedowns at the end of the decade.   Some have suggested that the plans to 
forgive loans to Highly Indebted Poor Countries might work the same way, but Henry and Arslanalp (2005) 
conclude not.    Also Edwards (2002).   
190 Friedman (2000), Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven (2003), Frankel and Roubini (2003) . 
191 Sachs  (1998).  One short-lived version was the proposed Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism.  
Krueger (2003) and Shleifer (2003).    53
realistic way to accomplish private sector involvement without the worst of the moral 
hazard problems of IMF bailouts.   The prediction of Barry Eichengreen, that the 
adoption of CACs would not discourage investors in the case of more creditworthy 
issuers, appears to have been accurate.
192  But neither have they yet made a big difference 
in crisis resolution. 
Ex ante provision of collateral can allow financing to take place where reputations 
and other institutions are not strong enough to sustain it otherwise.  Models that presume 
the necessity of collateral in emerging markets are some of the most promising for 
possible re-importation back into the mainstream of macroeconomics in rich countries.
193 
We have mentioned above attractions of financing via equity, FDI, and 
commodity-indexed bonds.   Each of these can be regarded as risk-sharing arrangements 
that are more efficient than ordinary bonds or bank loans: in the event of a “bad state of 
nature,” such as a decline in world demand for the country’s exports, the foreign investor 
suffers some of the losses automatically, avoiding the need for protracted negotiations 
with the borrower.     
 
8.6.  Early warning indicators 
 
Having learned to become less ambitious than attempting to estimate full structural 
models of reality, some economists have tried to the simpler task of testing whether 
economic indicators can help predict when and where emerging market crises will 
strike.
194   One motivation is to shed light on competing models of speculative attack, or 
theories of crisis origins more generally.   Often the motivation is just to give policy-
makers some advanced warning of possible crises, so that the dangers can be addressed 
before disaster strikes.  (For this motivation, one must make sure that the relevant data 
are available in real time.)    
It is often pointed out that if reliable indicators of this sort were readily at hand, they 
would induce behavior that would disrupt the relationship:  either private investors would 
pull out of the country at an earlier date or else policy-makers would correct imbalances 
in time and so prevent the crisis altogether .    This point is useful as a caveat to 
researchers not to expect that finding reliable indicators will be easy.   But neither is it a 
reason not to try.     If observable imbalances get gradually worse as the probability of a 
crisis rises, it is natural for the IMF (or any other party) to be at the forefront of those 
trying to ascertain the relationships.   If the research bears fruit, and policymakers’ 
actions then succeed in eliminating crises, that is a consummation devoutly to be wished 
for.    More likely the IMF would be faced with the dilemma posed by the knowledge that 
announcing concerns when the crisis probability rises to, say, 50%, runs the risk of 
precipitating a crisis that otherwise might not have occurred.    In any case, we are not in 
the fortunate position of having had tremendous success in finding early warning 
indicators. 
                                                 
192 Eichengreen and Portes (1995), Eichengreen (1999),  Eichengreen and Mody (2004). 
193 Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000, 2001, 2003, 2005) and Mendoza and Smith (2006).   It goes back 
to the seminar article of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). 
194  Berg and Pattillo (1999a, b) and Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) evaluate different 
approaches.   54
The studies often use panels, combining a cross-section of many countries with time 
series.   A few studies use a cross-section of countries to see what determines which 
countries suffered more and which less when hit by the common shock of a salient global 
episode.
195 
 
Asset prices 
  Bubbles – or, perhaps safer to say, extreme booms – in equity markets and real 
estate markets have come to be associated with high-income countries.  But they can 
afflict emerging markets as well, as noted earlier.  Stock market prices are apparently 
among the more successful early warning indicators of crises in emerging markets. 
196  
 
Reserves 
The foreign exchange reserve holding behavior of developing countries differs in 
some ways from that of advanced countries. For one thing, they hold more.
197     Many 
studies have found that reserves, sometimes expressed as a ratio to the money supply, 
sometimes relative to short-term debt, would have been a useful predictor of the 
emerging market crises of the 1990s.
198 
After the emerging market crises of the 1990s, the traditional rule of thumb that 
developing countries should hold enough reserves to equal at least three months of 
imports was replaced by the “Guidotti rule.”  This is the guideline that  they should hold 
enough reserves to cover all foreign debt that is short-term or maturing within one year.  
most emerging market countries worked to increase their holdings of reserves strongly, 
typically raising the Guidotti ratio of reserves to short term debt climbed from below one 
to above one.
199  The motive was precautionary: to self insure against the effects of future 
crises or the need to return to the IMF.
 200  (It would be hard to say which they feared 
more.)    Economists wondered whether the levels of reserves were excessive, since most 
are held in the form of US Treasury bills which have a low rate of return.
201    This was 
                                                 
195 Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996b) for the “tequila effect” of the 1994 Mexican peso crisis;  Obstfeld, 
Shambaugh and Taylor (2009, 2010) or Rose and Spiegel (2009) for the 2008 global financial crisis. 
196 Rose and Spiegel (2009) find that equity prices are the only robustly significant indicators that can 
predict which countries got into trouble in 2008. 
197 And not just because developing countries are less likely to float than are advanced countries.  Frenkel 
(1974) and Frenkel and Jovanovic  (1981) .     
198 Including Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996b), Frankel and Rose (1996) and Kaminsky, Lizondo and 
Reinhart (1998), among others.  
199 Guidotti (2003). 
200 Aizenman (2009), Aizenman and Lee (2007), Aizenman and Marion (2003) and Jeanne and Ranciere 
(2009) conclude that reserves in emerging market countries generally can be explained by a precautionary 
model, although reserves in a few Asian countries exceed that level.   
201 Jeanne (2007) and Summers (2006).   Rodrik (2006) argued that the countries would be better off using 
some of the reserves to pay down short-term debt.      55
especially true of China.
202    But in the global financial crisis of 2008, it appears that the 
caution of most of the reserve holders was vindicated.
203 
  
Bank credit 
Many studies find that rapid expansion of domestic bank credit is an early warning 
indicator of crises.  Loayza and Ranciere (2006) note the contradiction of this finding 
with the literature that uses bank credit as a proxy for the extent of intermediation and 
financial development; the reconciliation is the distinction between the short run and the 
long run. 
 
Composition of inflows 
Some authors have found that the composition of capital inflows matters more than 
the total, in seeking to predict the frequency and severity of crises.
204 
International bank lending, in particular, has been implicated in most crises, usually 
because of the acute problem of moral hazard created by the prospect of government 
bailouts.  Foreign direct investment is a less risky source of capital inflow than loans.
205  
The same is true of equity flows.
206  
  As noted in Part 2, borrowers with a currency mismatch – foreign currency 
liabilities and domestic currency revenues -- suffer from an adverse balance sheet when 
the currency is forced into devaluation.
207   Analogously, borrowers with a maturity 
mismatch – liabilities that are shorter-term than the domestic investment projects in 
which the funds were invested – suffer when interest rates are forced upward. 
208  
Conditions that make a crisis painful when it happens do not automatically imply that 
crises are more likely to happen.
209   But the majority view is that poorly structured 
balance sheets, suffering from currency mismatch or maturity mismatch, make crises 
both more likely to occur, and more severe when they do occur.   Indeed, as we have seen 
in Part 7, many of the latter-day models of speculative attack are based precisely on the 
balance sheet problem. 
                                                 
202 Many, such as Goldstein and Lardy  (2009), believe China’s peg to the dollar is essentially mercantilist, 
while McKinnon (2004) argues that it is appropriate.  Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003), argue 
that China’s tremendous amassing of reserves is not precautionary, but rather part of a deliberate and 
successful development strategy.   This claim is consistent with the general finding of Rodrik (2008) that 
currency undervaluation promotes growth. 
203 Aizenman (2009) and Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2009, 2010) find that high reserve levels paid 
off after all, in the global crisis of 2008, because those with high reserves were statistically less likely to get 
into trouble.  Rose and Spiegel (2009), however, do not find reserves to have been a useful predictor in 
2008. 
204 Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia.(2004) and Frankel and Rose (1996) find significant effects of composition 
measures in probit regressions, but not for overall ratios of current account deficits or debt to GDP.   
205 E.g., Lipsey (2001) and Frankel and Rose (1996). 
206 Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (1998). 
207 Baliño, Bennett, Borensztein (1999), Calvo,  Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004), and Cespedes et al. (2003).  
Calvo, et al. (2003) call it “domestic liability dollarization.”  
208 E.g., Rodrik and Velasco (1999). 
209 Some have argued that circumstances making crises more severe will also make them less likely to 
happen because steps will be taken to avoid them.   E.g., Dooley (2000b).   56
Measuring mismatch is more difficult than talking about it.  One proxy for 
currency mismatch is the ratio of foreign liabilities of the financial sector to money.
210  
An alternative proxy is a measure of deposit dollarization computed as “Dollar Deposits / 
Total Deposits” in the financial system.
211 
The ratio of short-term debt to reserves has received attention, of which the 
Guidotti threshold (1.0) is one case.   Perhaps because the ratio efficiently combines two 
important numbers, reserves and short-term debt, the ratio is emphasized in more studies 
of early warning indicators than any other statistic.
212 
 
 
9. Summary of Conclusions 
 
The macroeconomics of developing countries has become a field of its own.   
Among the characteristics that distinguish most developing countries from the large 
industrialized countries are: greater exposure to supply shocks in general and trade 
volatility in particular (especially for the commodity exporters), procyclicalty of 
international finance (contrary to orthodox theory), lower credibility with respect to both 
price stability and default risk (due in part to a past history of financing deficits by 
seignorage and default), procyclicality of fiscal policy (due in part to the imposition of 
austerity in crises), and other imperfect institutions. 
Some models of monetary policy originally designed for industrialized countries -
- dynamic inconsistency in monetary policy and the need for central bank independence 
and commitment to nominal targets – apply even more strongly to developing countries, 
in light of the credibility problem.  But because most developing countries are price-
takers on world markets, the small open economy model, with nontraded goods, is more 
often useful than the two-country two-good model.    Contractionary effects of 
devaluation are far more important for developing countries, particularly the balance 
sheet effects that arise from currency mismatch. 
 
  The choice of exchange rate regime is no more clear-cut for emerging market 
countries than it is for advanced countries.   On the one hand, small size, openness and 
less developed financial markets point relatively more to fixed exchange rates.  On the 
other hand, terms of trade volatility and the experience with speculative attacks point 
toward more flexible exchange rates.   Some began to float after the crises of the 1990s.   
In place of the exchange rate as favored nominal target for monetary policy, the 
conventional wisdom has anointed inflation targeting, with the CPI as the choice for price 
index.   This chapter has departed in one place from the mission of neutrally surveying 
the literature:  It argues that events associated with the global crisis of 2007-09 have 
revealed limitations to this role for the CPI.  
 
                                                 
210 Alesina and Wagner (2003) and Guidotti et. al. (2003).    The drawback, of course, is that the foreign 
liabilities of the financial sector is not the same as foreign-currency liabilities of domestic residents.    
Goldstein and Turner (2004). 
211 Computed by Arteta (2005a, b). 
212  Examples include Berg, Borensztein, Milesi-Ferreti, and Pattillo (1999), Frankel and Rose (1996), 
Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart  (2000), Mulder, Perrelli and Rocha (2002), Rodrik and Velasco (1999, 
2000), and  Sachs (1998) among others.   57
  Although the participation of emerging markets in global finance is a major 
reason why they have by now earned their own large body of research, they remain 
highly prone to problems of asymmetric information, illiquidity, default risk, moral 
hazard and imperfect institutions.  Many of the models designed to fit developing 
countries were built around such financial market imperfections, and few thought this 
inappropriate.    Since the crisis of 2007-09 showed that the United States and other rich 
countries have these problems too, to a much greater extent than previously understood, 
perhaps some of the models that had been applied to emerging markets could now be of 
service in thinking how to rebuild mainstream monetary macroeconomics.   58
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